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ARTICLE IX, ARTICLE III, AND THE FIRST
CONGRESS: THE ORIGINAL CONSTITUTIONAL
PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS, 1787–1792
Thomas H. Lee*
This Article describes the original constitutional plan for the U.S. Supreme
Court and the lower federal courts as set out in Article III of the U.S
Constitution, debated at the Constitutional Convention and state ratifying
conventions, implemented by the First Congress, and realized with the first
case docketed at the Supreme Court, from 1787 to 1792. In so doing, it relies
on close readings of three primary sources: Article IX of the Articles of
Confederation, the Judiciary Act of 1789, and the Process Act of 1789. The
First Judiciary Act is well known but not often read and analyzed holistically
as a single, integrated enactment designed to address concerns voiced during
the state ratification conventions. Article IX and the First Process Act are
neither well known nor identified as key sources of Article III of the
Constitution and its original meaning. This Article enlarges modern
conventional wisdoms about the early U.S. federal courts by showing:
 Their distinctly pro-foreigner orientation as befitting a new weak state,
in sore need of inbound foreign trade, credit, and investment;
 The essentiality of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to promote
international and interstate peace and harmony;
 The controversial nature of the Court’s appellate jurisdiction “both as
to Law and Fact” when the Constitution was discussed and adopted
(1787–1788), based on the example of the national appeals court for
captures under Article IX of the Articles of Confederation;
 The limited scope of state law rules of decision and procedures within
the Article III categories of federal judicial power that the First Congress
actually vested;
 The relatively limited importance of Article III “arising under” federal
jurisdiction as an original matter outside of federal crimes and revenue
laws; and

* Leitner Family Professor of International Law, Fordham University School of Law. This

Article was prepared for the Symposium entitled The Federalist Constitution, hosted by the
Fordham Law Review on October 2, 2020, at Fordham University School of Law. I am
grateful to William Casto, Andrew Kent, Ethan Leib, and Henry Monaghan for helpful
comments; Daniel Lutfy for research assistance; and Eric Lim, Corey Matthews, Saniya Suri,
and the other editors of the Fordham Law Review for their patience and editorial assistance.

1895

1896


FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 89

The overall “nationalist” orientation of the federal courts, to
subordinate state interests to the overwhelming national survival interest
in international and interstate peace and commerce.
INTRODUCTION

This Article illuminates certain nationalist aspects of the original plan for
the U.S. Supreme Court and the lower federal courts in the constitutional
system of the founding period from 1787 to 1792 that are forgotten or ignored
today. By “nationalist,” I mean that the federal courts were originally
established, in significant part, to reduce tensions with foreign governments
by subordinating states’ conflicting interests and protecting foreigners and
providing them favorable forums for resolving maritime and commercial
disputes with Americans. The paramount concerns were to ensure that the
United States stuck together to keep its international law commitments, most
importantly under the 1783 Treaty of Peace with Great Britain, and to restore
and facilitate interstate and international commerce while keeping that
peace.1 One little known aspect of the mission to mitigate foreign friction
was a distinct favoritism for foreign litigants and procedures over American
litigants and state law procedures. For example, section 11 of the Judiciary
Act of 1789,2 the famous “assignee clause” (presently codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1359), prohibited assignment of claims to generate federal jurisdiction but
did not apply to “cases of foreign bills of exchange,” although it blocked
assignment of domestic bills of exchange to out-of-state Americans seeking
to get into federal court.3 Additionally, part of section 9 of the Judiciary Act,
which is commonly known as the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), permitted
friendly and neutral “aliens” to sue for any torts—noncontract injuries to their
persons or properties—while most out-of-state American tort plaintiffs
would be blocked by a five-hundred-dollar amount-in-controversy
requirement.4 Finally, the Process Act of 1789 specified that “forms and

1. The first proposal for establishing a supreme court and lower federal courts
contemplated jurisdiction over “all piracies & felonies on the high seas, captures from an
enemy; cases in which foreigners or citizens of other States applying to such jurisdictions may
be interested, or which respect the collection of the National revenue; . . . and questions which
may involve the national peace and harmony.” 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION
OF 1787, at 22 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) [hereinafter FARRAND’S RECORDS] (containing James
Madison’s notes regarding Edmund Randolph’s Virginia Plan for the Constitution).
2. This Article uses “Judiciary Act of 1789,” “First Judiciary Act,” and “Judiciary Act”
interchangeably.
3. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 79.
4. Id. § 9; see Thomas H. Lee, The Safe-Conduct Theory of the Alien Tort Statute, 106
COLUM. L. REV. 830, 895–900 (2006). For friendly and neutral aliens, such noncontract
injuries generally met the statute’s “in violation of the law of nations” requirement because
contemporaneous international law required a host sovereign state to provide safe conduct to
the nationals of foreign sovereign states with whom it was at peace. See id. at 879 (quoting
§ 9, 1 Stat. at 77). As William Blackstone explained in his Commentaries, “[C]ommitting acts
of hostility against such as are in amity, league, or truce with us, who are here under a general
implied safe-conduct; these are breaches of the public faith, without the preservation of which
there can be no intercourse or commerce between one nation and another.” 4 WILLIAM
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modes of proceedings in causes of equity, and of admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction . . . shall be according to the course of the civil law,” not
necessarily state law or English law, thereby promising favorable procedural
law to European litigants who were more learned in the civil law.5
This Article focuses on three key primary sources to draw out this
forgotten nationalist, pro-foreigner orientation in the original constitutional
plan for the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts. The first is Article
IX of the Articles of Confederation—an antecedent to Article III of the
Constitution and thus an important source of Article III’s original meaning
that is largely neglected by constitutional lawyers today. The second is the
Judiciary Act of 1789—the framework statute passed by the First Congress,
which created the federal court system. Although scholars have extensively
scrutinized the First Judiciary Act,6 they have not focused on its proforeigner orientation. Furthermore, there is confusion regarding the
Judiciary Act’s role as an interpretative aid to resolving ambiguity in Article
III and its importance as evidence of the original understanding of the
constitutional scope of federal judicial power where Article III is silent. By
explaining the interaction of certain key provisions of the Judiciary Act with
both Article III and the Bill of Rights, I hope to dispel some of that confusion.
The third key source in proving the nationalist feature of the original
understanding of the federal judicial power I have described is the First
Process Act. It was enacted on September 29, 1789, five days after the
Judiciary Act.7 As the first statute that the First Congress passed to prescribe
forms and modes of proceedings in the newly created federal courts, it was
the ultimate antecedent of the modern Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The
statute lasted less than three years (it was implicitly repealed on May 8,
17928) and has been underexamined. But, given its vintage, the First Process
Act is a crucial piece of evidence for divining the original understanding of
how the national courts were intended to operate and the original meaning of
Article III of the Constitution.
This Article’s explication of the original constitutional plan for the federal
courts expands on prior accounts in at least three significant respects. As a
general matter, federal courts scholarship usually begins with how the
judiciary fits into separation of powers theory and what the courts do and
should do now, rather than scrutinizing the primary sources and solving the
puzzle of what they did then. First, although there is excellent legal academic
scholarship on the importance of the Supreme Court and the federal courts in
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *68. Enemy nationals were generally barred from suing in the
courts of another sovereign state with which their sovereign was at war.
5. Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 21, § 2, 1 Stat. 93, 93–94. Consequently, a Dutch creditor
could assign a bill of exchange to a New York agent to sue a New York debtor in federal court,
even though a New York creditor could not sue a New York debtor directly or assign its claim
to a Connecticut agent. See infra Part I.E.
6. See, e.g., ORIGINS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY: ESSAYS ON THE JUDICIARY ACT OF 1789
(Maeva Marcus ed., 1992) [hereinafter ORIGINS].
7. See ch. 21, 1 Stat. 93.
8. Process Act, ch. 36, § 2, 1 Stat. 275, 276 (1792).
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the foreign affairs of the early United States,9 there is little discussion of the
pro-foreigner orientation and the technical aspects of how the judicial branch
would play this role in the new republic. Similarly, nonlegal scholarship
about the centrality of the dire foreign policy picture at the founding to the
creation of the Constitution does not examine how the design and operation
of the federal courts under Article III and the First Judiciary Act addressed
such concerns.10 This Article shows how the fact that the United States was
militarily weak and fearful of the European powers’ influence, yet desirous
of peace, credit, and trade with them, led to the establishment of federal
courts as foreigner-friendly alternatives to state courts for dispute resolution
in maritime and other cross-border commercial and investment cases. The
motive is identical to the turn today toward international commercial
arbitration and courts by countries seeking to encourage foreign investment
and trade today.11
Second, there is a conventional view that the federal courts were originally
designed to operate like state and English common-law courts, including by
adhering to state rules of decision and procedures. Julius Goebel, the
preeminent historian of the early U.S. courts, famously propounded the
theory in his opening volume of The Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise History
of the Supreme Court of the United States.12 The Supreme Court’s decision
in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,13 abolishing federal court power to use
principles of “general law” to decide a tort suit brought by a citizen of one
state against a citizen of another (only one of nine categories of Article III
judicial power), is the modern bellwether precedent for the view. Goebel
was correct that English common law, mediated by state law, controlled the
law side of the federal courts’ jurisdiction, but the dockets of the early federal
courts were crowded with equity (e.g., title fights under conflicting states’
land grants), admiralty (e.g., disputes about collisions, salvage, and lost or
spoiled cargo), and maritime (e.g., contested captures at sea during
hostilities) causes. And, with respect to those causes, in the crucial years
between 1787 and 1792—when Americans drafted, debated, and ratified the
Constitution, when the First Congress established the federal judicial system
and the processes federal courts were to apply, and when the Supreme Court
and lower federal courts started hearing cases—the original understanding
9. See, e.g., WILLIAM R. CASTO, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC: THE
CHIEF JUSTICESHIPS OF JOHN JAY AND OLIVER ELLSWORTH (1995); MARTIN S. FLAHERTY,
RESTORING THE GLOBAL JUDICIARY: WHY THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD RULE IN U.S.
FOREIGN AFFAIRS 1–45 (2019).
10. See, e.g., MAX M. EDLING, A REVOLUTION IN FAVOR OF GOVERNMENT: ORIGINS OF
THE U.S. CONSTITUTION AND THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN STATE (2003); FREDERICK W.
MARKS III, INDEPENDENCE ON TRIAL: FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE MAKING OF THE
CONSTITUTION (1973).
11. See Pamela K. Bookman, The Adjudication Business, 45 YALE J. INT’L L. 227, 231
(2020).
12. See generally 1 JULIUS GOEBEL JR., THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE (Stanley
N. Katz ed., 1971); 1 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY
(1922).
13. 304 U.S. 64, 72 (1938).
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and design of the federal judicial branch consciously departed from English
and state law models. This Article demonstrates how the Goebel and Erie
position of state and English common-law dominance as a matter of this
original constitutional plan is incomplete, despite the fact that state and
English common-law habits persisted and were plainly ascendant by the end
of 1792, even in equity, admiralty, and maritime suits.14 That federal judges
should defer to state law and procedures, generally refrain from “making”
law under other of Article III’s nine grants of judicial power (e.g.,
ambassadorial or admiralty or maritime jurisdiction), and leave foreign
policy to the political branches is constitutional dogma today, and they are
beliefs formed after decades of historical practice and institutional evolution.
But that dogma is not compelled by the original constitutional plan for the
federal courts as it was drawn up and implemented from 1787 to 1792.
Third, another prevalent modern understanding of the Supreme Court,
underscored by the federal courts scholar Henry Hart, is that its “essential
role” in our “constitutional plan” is the Court’s appellate jurisdiction,
particularly of state court decisions.15 Hart’s view requires enlargement in
two respects, at least with respect to the plan when the Constitution was
framed and initially implemented. First, the Supreme Court’s original
jurisdiction of “all Cases affecting” foreign “Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party,”16 such as
“Controversies between two or more States,”17 was also seen as an essential
role in the plan, to promote international peace and harmony. The Court’s
decision in 1803 in Marbury v. Madison,18 which baptized judicial review,
was itself a failed original jurisdiction case. Judicial review—the Supreme
Court’s power to declare governmental acts unconstitutional—may be
exercised in the Court’s original jurisdiction as well as its appellate
jurisdiction.19 The words of Article III of the Constitution explicitly require
the two original jurisdiction roles because they were seen as “essential” to
keep peace with the European powers that ambassadors represented, as well
14. In the modern era, it was the Supreme Court’s decision in Guaranty Trust Co. v. York
that extended the Erie principle to equity actions in the federal courts. See Guar. Tr. Co. v.
York, 326 U.S. 99, 111 (1945) (“To make an exception to Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins on the
equity side of a federal court is to reject the considerations of policy which, after long travail,
led to that decision.”).
15. See Henry M. Hart Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal
Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1364–65 (1953). Henry Monaghan
reminds us that Hart’s famous Dialogue “still remains the mesmerizing starting point for
anyone interested in congressional control of the Article III courts.” Henry P. Monaghan,
Jurisdiction Stripping Circa 2020: What The Dialogue (Still) Has to Teach Us, 69 DUKE L.J.
1, 66–67 (2019). Hart was also one of the two original authors of the leading casebook-treatise
on federal courts law, now in its seventh edition. RICHARD H. FALLON JR. ET AL., HART AND
WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (7th ed. 2015).
16. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
17. Id. cl. 1.
18. 5 U.S. (2 Cranch) 137 (1803).
19. James Pfander has previously remarked on the Court’s original jurisdiction as a means
for enforcing federal rights against states. See James E. Pfander, Rethinking the Supreme
Court’s Original Jurisdiction in State-Party Cases, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 555, 559–61 (1994).
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as among the states. Second, when the Constitution was drafted and adopted
between 1787 and 1788, the Court’s appellate jurisdiction “both as to Law
and Fact” was seen as key to ensuring uniform enforcement of federal laws,
but it was also extremely controversial because of the potential for retrial of
state jury verdicts in a distant capital based on the example of the national
appeals court for captures under Article IX of the Articles of Confederation
and the absence of any constitutional provisions against reexamination of
state jury findings. And when the First Congress decided to create lower
federal courts with exclusive original jurisdiction as to federal crimes,
revenue laws, and admiralty and maritime cases (except for common-law
causes) in 1789, it mitigated this need for uniform enforcement via the
Court’s appellate jurisdiction: lower federal court exclusive original
jurisdiction and the Court’s appellate jurisdiction were, to some extent,
functional substitutes then as they are today. Modern debates about what
Article III allows Congress to do with federal jurisdiction and the Supreme
Court’s essential role must take into the account the Court’s original
jurisdiction and the significant concerns voiced at the adoption of the
Constitution regarding its appellate jurisdiction, as well as well-trod
arguments for its need.20 Relatedly and more generally, the original plan for
the federal courts envisioned them not only as public law institutions to
decide questions of constitutional law and to enforce federal laws but also as
admiralty and commercial courts to promote interstate and international trade
by supplying credibly neutral dispute resolution services. Today, the notion
that federal courts were designed to be active in foreign affairs and to operate
as “pro-business” commercial courts would be viewed by many as contrary
to the original constitutional plan, not consistent with it.
My intent in illuminating the 1787–1792 plan for the federal courts is not
to suggest that we should resurrect it or seek to apply it again to the present
in any way: I am not an originalist in that sense. My intent, rather, is to draw
a more accurate and complete picture of how the original adopters of the
Constitution designed the Supreme Court and federal courts to operate and
20. Some jurists and scholars have argued that the Constitution requires Congress to vest
some judicial power over “all Cases arising under the constitution, laws, and treaties of the
United States” (federal question jurisdiction) in federal courts, whether lower court original
jurisdiction and/or Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction. Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S.
(1 Wheat.) 304, 339 (1816). In Martin, Justice Joseph Story distinguished between Article
III, Section 2’s use of “all Cases” “arising under” federal law, “affecting Ambassadors,” and
“of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction” and the absence of “all” before listed
“Controversies,” such as those “to which the United States shall be a Party.” See id. at 333–
37. Justice Story reasoned that the Framers intended jurisdiction to be mandatory for the three
enumerated sets of “all Cases,” including arising under cases, whereas for “Controversies”
lacking the word “all,” Congress could “qualify the jurisdiction, original or appellate, in such
manner as public policy might dictate.” Id. at 334. See generally Akhil Reed Amar, The TwoTiered Structure of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1499 (1990) (reframing
Justice Story’s argument); Lawrence Gene Sager, The Supreme Court, 1980 Term—
Foreword: Constitutional Limitations on Congress’ Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of
the Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17, 44 (1981) (arguing that Congress’s Article III power
to make exceptions to the Court’s appellate jurisdiction is “not an unambiguous license for
Congress to do as it pleases”).
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the objectives they sought to accomplish by establishing them. The Framers
and ratifiers of the original constitutional plan were not only political
theorists but also empiricists and nation builders who designed and
implemented new national institutions (including courts) to fit their practical
governance imperatives, most pertinently, their geopolitical circumstances as
a new, weak state. How that original picture should factor into constitutional
interpretation today is a different question. If the Framers and ratifiers were
to see our world, process our data, and observe our society and its political
realities, would they have come up with the same solutions? What does it
mean to be an originalist in matters of constitutional interpretation anyway?
Must we stay faithful to the original meanings of written words when they
became the Constitution? If so, then the original plan I have sketched may
be the binding blueprint for what is constitutionally required today. Such
questions can and should be debated forever. But to the extent that arguments
on one side or the other invoke the original meaning of Article III, the original
understanding of the federal judicial power in 1787 or 1789, the original
constitutional plan for the Supreme Court and the federal courts, or some
such formula of founding-era pedigree, I believe it is necessary to have as
accurate a sense as possible of what that was. Hence, this Article.
This Article proceeds in two parts. Part I discusses the relevant history
and key sources. My treatment will be brief, sketching widely known aspects
and providing greater detail on uncharted matters. Part II revises modern
conventional wisdom about the federal courts based on the account in Part I.
I. CONTEXT AND TEXTS IN THE CREATION OF A NATIONAL JUDICIARY
A. Articles of Confederation
Scholarship regarding the Article III courts generally neglects the
important antecedent of the Articles of Confederation.21 Admittedly, courts
were a minor feature of the centralized government established by the
Articles, which is unsurprising since it was a wartime constitution.22
Ordinary justice delivered by courts is not a priority in war. Besides, the
states already had courts of long standing as a legacy of British colonialism.
But the Articles did provide for proto-national tribunals23 in a manner that
plainly influenced the plans for the judicial branch discussed at the
Constitutional Convention that produced Article III of the Constitution.
21. Goebel is the notable exception: his account of Article IX of the Articles of
Confederation is characteristically rich and thorough in description, but he does not elaborate
on its possible influence on Article III of the Constitution. See 1 GOEBEL, supra note 12, at
143–95. And despite his immense store of knowledge (or perhaps because of it), his account
sometimes gets lost in the minutiae and obscures the larger themes.
22. The Second Continental Congress deliberated and approved the Articles by November
17, 1777, and they became fully ratified by all thirteen states on March 1, 1781, upon
ratification by Maryland. MICHAEL J. GARCIA ET AL., CONG. RSCH. SERV., THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION, S. DOC. NO. 112-9, at
XVIII (2017).
23. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IX.
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Article IX of the Articles of Confederation addressed courts in four specific
categories of subject matter.
1. Piracies and Felonies Committed on the High Seas
First, Article IX provided that the “United States, in Congress assembled,
shall have the sole and exclusive right and power of . . . appointing courts for
the trial of piracies and felonies committed on the high seas.”24
“[A]ppointing courts” apparently entailed Congress designating existing
state courts to try piracies and felonies on the high seas, not establishing new
courts to try those crimes under the maritime law of nations. The distinction
between “appointing” and “establishing” courts in the Articles of
Confederation yields a clue to interpreting Article III of the Constitution,
which specifies that “[t]he judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested
in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from
time to time ordain and establish.”25 However, when the Continental
Congress actually passed the ordinance invoking this Article IX power in
April 1781, it provided for “establishing courts” to try the crimes “as if the
piracy or felony were committed upon the land,” with juries “according to
the course of the common law,” and “any two or more” state justices or
judges “constituted and appointed judges for hearing and trying such
offenders.”26
2. “All Cases” of Maritime Capture
A second provision—also dealing with maritime jurisdiction—granted the
United States in Congress the “exclusive right and power” of “establishing
courts for receiving and determining finally appeals in all cases of captures;
provided that no member of Congress shall be appointed a judge of any of
the said courts.”27 Original jurisdiction was wielded by state admiralty
courts, which the states had quickly established to condemn prizes given the
importance of interdicting Great Britain’s sea-lanes once hostilities had
commenced. As early as June 1775, Elbridge Gerry urged the Massachusetts
legislature to fit out armed ships and to establish a prize court to condemn
captured ships and cargoes.28 Five months later, on November 11, 1775,
George Washington wrote to John Hancock, president of the Continental
Congress, pleading for the establishment of a prize court for the Continental
Navy: “Should not a court be established by authority of Congress, to take
cognizance of prizes made by the Continental vessels? Whatever the mode

24. Id. para. 1.
25. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (emphasis added).
26. 19 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774–1789, at 354–55 (Worthington
Chauncey Ford ed., 1905) (Apr. 1781).
27. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IX, para. 1.
28. JAMES T. AUSTIN, THE LIFE OF ELBRIDGE GERRY 94 (Boston, Wells & Lilly 1828).
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is . . . there is an absolute necessity of its being speedily determined . . . .”29
On April 4, 1776, the Continental Congress itself, for the first and only time,
took original jurisdiction in the matter of a British vessel that had run
aground, condemning it as a prize and ordering it sold.30 Thereafter, the state
admiralty courts acted as prize courts, with appeals to Congress as eventually
codified in Article IX.
When Congress did come around to establishing a court of appeals for
maritime captures, “appeals” entailed full-blown trials, not appellate review
of only legal issues in the modern sense.31 No deference was required to the
state courts’ findings of fact or law, even when the case had been tried by
jury, as some states provided for in their admiralty courts, in contrast to the
practice of adjudication exclusively by admiralty judges in Britain and
continental Europe.32 All factual and legal findings could be reexamined.
As James Wilson underscored later at the Constitutional Convention, the
consensus was that the general court of appeals’ jurisdiction in admiralty and
maritime cases would mirror the practice in civilian admiralty courts, not the
jury practice of the common-law courts.33 Indeed, overriding state jury
verdicts was the main reason for setting up this first federal court for appeals
from state admiralty courts in the first place, as the Continental Congress
explained:
That a controul by appeal is necessary, in order to compel a just and
uniform execution of the law of nations:
That the said controul must extend as well over the decisions of juries as
judges in courts for determining the legality of captures on the sea;
otherwise the juries would be possessed of the ultimate supreme power of
executing the law of nations in all cases of captures, and might at any time
exercise the same in such manner as to prevent a possibility of being
controuled; a construction which . . . would disable the Congress of the
United States from giving satisfaction to foreign nations complaining of a
violation of neutralities, of treaties or other breaches of the law of nations,
and would enable a jury in any one State to involve the United States in
hostilities . . . .”34

The Continental Congress had initially handled prize appeals from the
state admiralty courts by ad hoc special committees and then through a five29. Letter from George Washington to John Hancock (Nov. 11, 1775), in 3 THE WRITINGS
GEORGE WASHINGTON 213, 213–14 (Worthington Chauncey Ford ed., New York, G. P.
Putnam’s Sons 1889).
30. See Today in Naval History: April 4, NAVAL HIST. & HERITAGE COMMAND,
https://www.history.navy.mil/content/history/nhhc/today-in-history/april-4.html
[https://perma.cc/CFK6-VX66] (last visited Mar. 16, 2021) (“Continental Navy Frigate
Columbus captures the British schooner HMS Hawk, making the first American capture of a
British armed vessel.”).
31. See Richard P. McCormick, Ambiguous Authority: The Ordinances of the
Confederation Congress, 1781–1789, 41 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 411, 422 (1997).
32. Id.
33. 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 157.
34. 13 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774–1789, supra note 26, at 284 (Mar.
6, 1779).
OF

1904

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 89

member standing committee.35 It was only by a statute enacted on January
15, 1780, that Congress finally established a court of appeals for maritime
captures, as Washington had advised more than four years earlier:
Resolved, That a court be established for the trial of all appeals from the
courts of admiralty in these United States, in cases of capture, to consist of
three judges, appointed and commissioned by Congress, either two of
whom, in the absence of the other, to hold the said court for the despatch of
business:
....
That the trials therein be according to the usage of nations and not by
jury . . . .36

The implicit substitutability of a congressional committee and a court is an
important feature of Article IX. This interchangeable use of Congress and a
court of appeals in the Articles-of-Confederation period undermines the
modern view, embraced even by originalists, that founding-era Americans
drew sharp distinctions between exclusively legislative versus judicial
powers and institutions.37 The founders were practicing revolutionaries who
used whatever resources were available to solve urgent real-life problems of
governance. They would not necessarily have presumed clean lines between
the judicial and legislative powers of the general government.
During the War of Independence, sixty-four cases were submitted to the
committees of Congress, which decided forty-nine of them and passed eleven
to the Court of Appeals in Cases of Capture for decision.38 Appeals came
from all of the states, except New York, which was occupied by the British
from the fall of 1776 until the end of the war, and Georgia, where the
principal ports of Savannah and Brunswick were also occupied by British
forces for most of the war.39 The Court of Appeals in Cases of Capture is
widely recognized by scholars as the first “federal court” and the prototype
for the U.S. Supreme Court.40 By the time the court issued its final decree
of dismissal in Philadelphia on May 3, 1787, weeks before the Constitutional
Convention, Goebel reports, “[T]he records indicate that a total of fifty-six
cases [were] disposed of.”41 What is less well known, but as clear, is that
35. Matthew P. Harrington, The Legacy of the Colonial Vice-Admiralty Courts (pt. 2), 27
J. MAR. L. & COM. 323, 342–43 (1996).
36. 16 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774–1789, supra note 26, at 61
(second emphasis added).
37. See, e.g., William Baude, Adjudication Outside Article III, 133 HARV. L. REV. 1511,
1520 (2020) (asserting that, “[b]ecause Article III vests [the judicial power of the United
States] in the federal courts, nobody else can have it”).
38. J. C. Bancroft Davis, Federal Courts Prior to the Adoption of the Constitution, 131
U.S. app. xix, xxxiv (1889).
39. See Harrington, supra note 35, at 341 n.167. Both states established admiralty courts
that do not appear to have heard any cases of maritime capture. See id.
40. See generally HENRY J. BOURGUIGNON, THE FIRST FEDERAL COURT: THE FEDERAL
APPELLATE PRIZE COURT OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, 1775–1787 (1977). The court sat
in Hartford, Philadelphia, New York City, and possibly other cities, with its final May 1787
sitting in Philadelphia.
41. 1 GOEBEL, supra note 12, at 182.
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Article III’s provision for “appellate Jurisdiction”42 had its antecedent in the
appellate jurisdiction of this court, which was designed to control state juries
and ensure compliance with the law of nations.
3. Controversies Between Two or More States
The third type of tribunal that Article IX provided for was authorized to
decide controversies between two or more states: “The United States, in
Congress assembled, shall also be the last resort on appeal, in all disputes and
differences now subsisting, or that hereafter may arise between two or more
States concerning boundary, jurisdiction, or any other cause whatever.”43
Again, the specification was couched in the language of appellate
jurisdiction—“the last resort on appeal,”44 although such resort was to
“Congress” not a court. In contrast to appeals from prize cases in the state
admiralty courts, which, as we have seen, were initially entrusted to
committees of the Continental Congress, Article IX contained an elaborate
procedure for selecting judges to decide interstate disputes if the state parties
could not themselves agree on a tribunal, presumably because of their special
sensitivity. Five, seven, or nine judges—alternatively referred to as
“commissioners”—were to be drawn from three names submitted by each
state in the Confederation.45 Each state party could then, in turn, strike a
name from the aggregate list until thirteen names remained, from which
Congress would draw by lot “not less than seven, nor more than nine
names . . . and the persons whose names shall be so drawn, or any five of
them, shall be commissioners or judges.”46 Even today, the International
Centre for Dispute Resolution—the international commercial arbitration
offshoot of the American Arbitration Association—uses a variation of the list

42. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (“In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme
Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and
under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.”).
43. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IX, para. 2.
44. Id.
45. Article IX, paragraph 2 provides:
Whenever the legislative or executive authority, or lawful agent of any State in
controversy with another, shall present a petition to Congress, stating the matter in
question, and praying for a hearing, notice thereof shall be given, by order of
Congress, to the legislative or executive authority of the other State in controversy,
and a day assigned for the appearance of the parties by their lawful agents, who shall
then be directed to appoint, by joint consent, commissioners or judges to constitute
a court for hearing and determining the matter in question; but if they cannot agree,
Congress shall name three persons out of each of the United States, and from the list
of such persons each party shall alternately strike out one, the petitioners beginning,
until the number shall be reduced to thirteen; and from that number not less than
seven, nor more than nine names, as Congress shall direct, shall, in the presence of
Congress, be drawn out by lot; and the persons whose names shall be so drawn, or
any five of them, shall be commissioners or judges, to hear and finally determine
the controversy, so always as a major part of the judges, who shall hear the cause,
shall agree in the determination . . . .
Id.
46. Id.
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procedure for selecting an arbitral tribunal in cases where private parties
cannot agree on who will decide their controversy.47
4. “All Controversies” Involving Land Claimed Under Grants from Two or
More States
Fourth, Article IX addressed the adjudication of “[a]ll controversies
concerning the private right of soil claimed under different grants of two or
more States.”48 Such controversies were to “be finally determined, as near
as may be, in the same manner as is before prescribed for deciding disputes
respecting territorial jurisdiction between different States”49—that is, by
“commissioners or judges” selected by the state parties or Congress, as set
out above.
***
A comparison of these four provisions in Article IX of the Articles of
Confederation and Article III of the Constitution reinforces a strong sense of
the influence of Article IX. All four subject matters made it onto the list of
cases and controversies to which the federal judicial power extends in Article
III, Section 2 of the Constitution.50 The constitutional category of
“Controversies between two or more States” in Article III, Section 2 has been
committed to the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
since the Judiciary Act of 1789 through to today.51 Prize cases and piracies
and felonies on the high seas—both falling within the category of maritime
cases—were covered by Article III’s grant of federal judicial power as to “all
Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction.”52 Since the First Judiciary
Act, original jurisdiction over admiralty and maritime cases has been vested
exclusively in federal courts, subject to the exception of “saving to suitors,
in all cases, the right of a common law remedy, where the common law is
competent to give it.”53 The fourth category—private disputes regarding
land grants from different states—is plainly the inspiration for the provision
in Article III of the Constitution extending federal judicial power to
“Controversies . . . between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under
Grants of different States.”54 According to James Madison’s notes, Roger
Sherman “moved to insert” those words “according to the provisions in the
47. INT’L CTR. FOR DISP. RESOL., INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCEDURES art.
12(6) (2014), https://www.icdr.org/sites/default/files/document_repository/ICDR_Rules.pdf?
utm_source=icdr-website&utm_medium=rules-page&utm_campaign=rules-intl
[https://perma.cc/4VAG-BAG7].
48. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IX, para. 3.
49. Id.
50. See U.S. CONST. art III, § 2.
51. This feature of mandatory original jurisdiction over interstate “Controversies” is in
tension with Justice Story’s and Professor Akhil Amar’s text-based theory that the three
categories of “all cases” must be vested in federal court and are therefore implicitly more
important exercises of judicial power than the six categories of “controversies,” which, lacking
the word “all,” need not be vested in federal court. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
52. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
53. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 77.
54. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
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9th art. of the Confederation—which was agreed to” without objection.55
One final, striking textual point of resemblance is the use of “all cases” with
reference to maritime captures and “all controversies” for disputes
concerning land grants of different states in Article IX. The words “all
Cases” marks the first three categories of judicial power in Article III, Section
2, including admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, while the word
“Controversies” marks the six subsequent categories of enumerated judicial
power, including “Controversies between two or more states.” In sum, the
evidence strongly suggests that the adopters of the Constitution consulted
and sometimes copied Article IX of the Articles of Confederation in
designing Article III. This continuity of national “judicial” power between
the Articles of Confederation and Article III of the Constitution is striking
but often overlooked, even by federal courts experts.
B. The Constitutional Convention
Although debate regarding the judiciary article at the Constitutional
Convention was relatively limited, it does yield some important clues. This
ground is well trod in contrast to discussion of the judiciary provisions of the
Articles of Confederation, and so I will be brief. There was consensus at the
Convention that there should be a national judiciary with a Supreme Court,
which both the Virginia and New Jersey Plans provided for.56 Disagreement
focused on how to appoint judges, their terms of office, and whether lower
federal courts should be created. Protection against salary diminution and
life tenure during good behavior were agreed on after some dialog.57 Debate
about judicial appointment procedures was more contested. The starting
point was the Virginia Plan’s proposal for appointment by the legislature, but
discussion shifted to consideration of the Senate as the appointing body on
Madison’s urging of a “less numerous & more select body.”58 Madison
changed his mind, concerned that this would give too much power over
federal court appointments to the states and instead proposed presidential
appointment, with or without Senate approval. The ultimate solution of
presidential appointment with the advice and consent of the Senate was part
of an omnibus settlement on appointments.59
Discussions regarding the creation of federal courts other than the
Supreme Court were the most heated and protracted debates about the
55. 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 431–32.
56. 1 id. at 21–22, 223–24; 3 id. at 600.
57. The original proposal for a federal judiciary in the Virginia Plan had prohibited
increases in salary too: federal judges were “to receive punctually at stated times fixed
compensation for their services, in which no increase or diminution shall be made so as to
affect the persons actually in office at the time of such increase or diminution.” 1 id. at 21–22.
Delegates John Dickinson (Pennsylvania), Elbridge Gerry (Massachusetts), and Roger
Sherman (Connecticut) also proposed removal by the president “on the application [by] the
Senate and House of Representatives,” for which only Connecticut voted. See 2 id. at 428–29
(alteration in original).
58. See 1 id. at 233 (June 13, 1787).
59. Cf. 2 id. at 132, 155, 169, 183 (reporting Convention proposals in which Supreme
Court Justices would be appointed by the Senate).
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national judiciary at the Convention. An initial consensus on establishing
“one or more inferior tribunals” was challenged by John Rutledge on the
view “that the State Tribunals might and ought to be left in all cases to decide
in the first instance” because “the right of appeal to the supreme national
tribunal” was “sufficient to secure the national rights & uniformity of
Judgmts.”60 Roger Sherman supported Rutledge based “on the supposed
expensiveness of having a new set of Courts, when the existing State Courts
would answer the same purpose.”61 Madison and James Wilson pushed back
strenuously. John Dickinson, supported by Madison and Wilson, suggested
as a compromise that Congress “be empowered to institute inferior
tribunals.”62 Pierce Butler resisted the compromise, asserting that “[t]he
people will not bear such innovations” and that “[t]he States will revolt at
such encroachments.”63 Dickinson’s motion passed, however, with eight
votes in favor.64
Details regarding the Article III specification of judicial powers and
allocations of original and appellate jurisdiction are harder to come by. The
Virginia Plan had originally provided:
[T]he jurisdiction of the inferior tribunals shall be to hear & determine in
the first instance, and of the supreme tribunal to hear and determine in the
dèrnier resort, all piracies & felonies on the high seas, captures from an
enemy; cases in which foreigners or citizens of other States applying to
such jurisdictions may be interested, or which respect the collection of the
National revenue; impeachments of any National officers, and questions
which may involve the national peace and harmony.65

In the Committee of the Whole, Randolph moved that the specific categories
of jurisdiction be left to the Committee of Detail, with only general guidance
“that the jurisdiction of the national judiciary shall extend to all cases of
national revenue, impeachment of national officers, and questions which
involve the national peace or harmony.”66 Madison later suggested a further
simplification of the guidance: “that the jurisdiction shall extend to all cases
arising under the Natl. laws: And to such other questions as may involve the
Natl. peace & harmony,” which was agreed to without objection.67 The

60. See 1 id. at 124. Michael Collins believes that Rutledge moved to reconsider because
the idea of the legislature appointing judges had been abandoned, and he and others feared
vesting the power with the president. See Michael G. Collins, Article III Cases, State Court
Duties, and the Madisonian Compromise, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 39, 116–19.
61. See 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 125.
62. Id. The records use the word “appoint,” id. at 118, which is the same word used in
Article IX of the Articles of Confederation as to the Continental Congress’s power to designate
courts for the trial of piracies and felonies on the high seas. Goebel notes that some delegates
wanted stronger clarification that Congress’s power under the Constitution would be the same
as under the Articles, with “the state courts participants in the national system.” 1 GOEBEL,
supra note 12, at 225.
63. See 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 125.
64. See id.
65. See id. at 22.
66. Id. at 238 (emphasis omitted).
67. 2 id. at 46.
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animating principle of the jurisdiction of the newly federal courts was thus
distinctively “national.”
The “cases” and “controversies” listed in Article III, Section 2, which were
the product of the Committee of Detail with substantial revision and input by
the Committee of Style, conform to the guidance given by the Committee of
the Whole. The nine categories to which the “judicial Power shall extend”
are:
(1) “all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the
Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under their Authority”;
(2) “all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public ministers and
Consuls”;
(3) “all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction”;
(4) “Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party”;
(5) “Controversies between two or more States”;
(6)
“between a State and Citizens of another State”;
(7)
“between Citizens of different States”;
(8)
“between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under
Grants of different States”; and
(9)
“between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States,
Citizens or Subjects.”68
The Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction clause uses the same language
as subheading two and a combination of parts of subheadings five, six, and
nine: “In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and
Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall
have original Jurisdiction.”69 The Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction is
the only judicial power that the Constitution’s plain language prohibits
Congress from altering. Article III states that “the supreme Court shall have
original Jurisdiction”70 without any recognition of congressional power to
tamper with the jurisdiction. By contrast, the Supreme Court’s “appellate
Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact,” “[i]n all the other Cases before
mentioned,” is subject to “such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as
the Congress shall make.”71 The extension of appellate jurisdiction to factfinding—as was the case with the state admiralty courts during the Articles
of Confederation—would be the subject of controversy during the state
68.
69.
70.
71.

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
Id. cl. 2.
Id.
Id.
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ratification conventions.72 With respect to inferior federal courts, the plain
language of the Constitution does not require Congress to create them: “The
judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested . . . in such inferior Courts
as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.”73
C. State Ratification Conventions
Considerable resistance to the new Constitution in the state ratification
conventions focused on the national judiciary. Nineteen of 103 constitutional
amendments proposed by the six ratifying states that suggested amendments
dealt with Article III.74 The principal focus of these amendments were:
(1) Express protection of the right to a jury trial in civil and criminal
cases. This was partly a reaction to prior experience with the national court
of appeals for maritime captures overturning state admiralty court jury
verdicts. These concerns produced the “saving to suitors” clause exception
to the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction and jury guarantees in the Judiciary
Act of 1789,75 as well as the Sixth Amendment76 and Seventh Amendment
jury trial protections.77
(2) Confining appellate power to questions of law, not of fact. Again,
this was an important issue because of the prior experience with the Court of
Appeals in Cases of Capture under the Articles of Confederation, which had
appellate jurisdiction as to questions of both law and fact, as we have seen.
And that model was explicitly replicated in Article III with the specification
of “both as to Law and Fact” in the appellate jurisdiction clause.78
Constraints on appellate jurisdiction, accordingly, were written into sections
22 and 25 of the First Judiciary Act by confinement to the writ of error as the
vehicle for Supreme Court appellate review, which was further

72. See, e.g., 10 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION
1399 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1993) [hereinafter DHRC] (reporting that
Edmund Pendleton, a supporter of the Constitution at the Virginia ratifying convention,
expressed the sentiment on June 19, 1788, that the words “both as to law and fact” “had been
buried in oblivion”); id. at 1420 (noting that, on the next day, Patrick Henry, an opponent of
the Constitution at the same convention, believed that the appellate jurisdiction would “in
operation destroy the trial by jury”).
73. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
74. PAULINE MAIER, RATIFICATION: THE PEOPLE DEBATE THE CONSTITUTION, 1787–1788,
at 286–91 (2010) (Virginia ratifying convention debates); id. at 449–54 (congressional
discussion of amendments).
75. See STEVEN L. SNELL, COURTS OF ADMIRALTY AND THE COMMON LAW: ORIGINS OF
THE AMERICAN EXPERIMENT IN CONCURRENT JURISDICTION 304–21 (2007).
76. “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed,
which district shall have been previously ascertained by law . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
77. “In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars,
the right of trial by jury shall be preserved . . . .” Id. amend. VII.
78. Id. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
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circumscribed to the “face of the record” for writs from the state courts,79
and by the Seventh Amendment Re-examination Clause.80
(3) Elimination of lower federal courts of first instance or limiting
them to admiralty courts or to what was minimally necessary to enforce
federal crimes and revenues.81 These reforms were effected by statute,
and there was no constitutional amendment.
Specifically, in the
Judiciary Act of 1789, the First Congress was parsimonious in doling out
lower federal court jurisdiction; most importantly, there was no civil
“arising under” jurisdiction vested, with the exception of the ATS and
the provision of jurisdiction for civil forfeitures or penalties under U.S.
laws on land. Additionally, the Judiciary Act imposed amount-incontroversy requirements in sections 9 through 12, and section 34 (the
Rules of Decision Act) prescribed state rules of decision in cases where
they applied, ensuring that even if lower federal court jurisdiction
extended to certain cases at law, the substantive law they would apply
would be that of the states.
(4) Elimination of diversity and alienage jurisdictions.
These
headings of judicial power had been designed to provide alternative
forums for foreign and out-of-state litigants to protect against potentially
biased judges and juries in state courts, and, to some extent, biased state
laws as well. The Rules of Decision Act preserved the operation of state
laws in response to these perceptions. The Judiciary Act’s amount-incontroversy requirements also cut out smaller-stakes matters under these
headings. Moreover, the assignee clause in section 11 prohibited
collusive assignments to generate diversity jurisdiction, although, as
noted above, foreign bills of exchange were exempted from the ambit of
the assignee clause.
In summary, the First Congress addressed most of the concerns that were
voiced in the state constitutional ratification debates by provisions in the
Judiciary Act of 1789, to which I turn next. The notable exceptions to
statutory fixes were the Sixth and Seventh Amendments targeting protection
of jury trial rights and particularly jury fact-finding. The fact that the First
Congress, which originated the entire Bill of Rights, decided to address these
particular constitutional concerns largely by subconstitutional fixes presents
an interesting solution and is a testimony to the genius of the First Judiciary
Act as a landmark framework statute establishing the federal court system.
D. The Judiciary Act of 1789
Implementing Article III and setting up the national judiciary were high
priorities when the First Congress met in the fall of 1789. George
79. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, §§ 22, 25, 1 Stat. 73, 84–87.
80. “In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty
dollars, . . . no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United
States, than according to the rules of the common law.” U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
81. See Charles Warren, New Light on the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARV. L.
REV. 49, 66–68, 119–27 (1923).
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Washington signed the First Judiciary Act into law on September 24, 1789.82
The statute established the Supreme Court as well as lower circuit and district
courts, defined their respective jurisdictions and terms, and provided for
court staff (clerks, marshals, and U.S. attorneys).83 It set up a Supreme Court
with a Chief Justice and five Associate Justices, thirteen district courts in the
eleven states that had ratified the Constitution (not North Carolina and Rhode
Island), and district courts for the part of Massachusetts that would become
Maine and the part of Virginia that would become Kentucky.84 The eleven
district courts were further grouped into three circuits: (1) Eastern
(Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and New York); (2) Middle
(Delaware, Maryland, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Virginia); and (3)
Southern (Georgia and South Carolina).85 Circuit courts consisting of two
Supreme Court Justices and the resident district judge were to be held twice
a year in each district, with a two-judge quorum and any district judge
recused “in any case of appeal or error from his own decision.”86
Three considerations are worth keeping in mind when contemplating the
geographical distribution of the district courts and the system of circuit courts
and Supreme Court Justices’ circuit riding. First, in a nod to their importance
as commercial (predominantly maritime) courts, the new federal district
courts were sited at principal sea and riverine ports, with the exceptions of
Williamsburg, Virginia, the colonial capital, and Harrodsburg, Kentucky,
which was the largest settlement west of the Appalachian Mountains at the
time.87 Second, there was an obvious balancing between the interest in
having a small federal judiciary for reasons of cost and avoiding
encroachment on state courts, on the one hand, and the interest in having both
trial courts and initial appeals courts spread throughout the country for
reasons of geographical convenience for potential litigants, on the other hand.
The First Judiciary Act ordained an extremely compact court system—
nineteen judges total; thirteen fixed district courts in commercial centers; and
the Supreme Court at the capital, with the six Supreme Court Justices riding
circuit to convene twice-a-year circuit courts in the districts with the resident
district judge. Third, less obvious but equally important, was the fact that the
thirteen district judges and the six Supreme Court Justices when riding circuit
represented the most senior federal officers appointed by the president “on
the ground” in the states in the late eighteenth century, an era in which the
federal government was an exceedingly modest going concern. President
George Washington expressed the sentiment aptly in his cover letter
transmitting the commission to serve as “Associate Judge in the Supreme
Court of the United States” to John Rutledge of South Carolina on September
30, 1789, six days after the Judiciary Act became law: “Considering the
Judicial System as the chief Pillar upon which our national Government must
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

See ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73.
Id. §§ 1–3, 1 Stat at 73–74.
Id.
Id. § 4, 1 Stat. at 74.
Id. §§ 4–5, 1 Stat. at 74–75.
Id. § 3, 1 Stat. at 73–74.
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rest, I have thought it my duty to nominate, for the high Offices in that
department, such men as I conceived would give dignity and lustre to our
National Character.”88
We turn now to the First Judiciary Act’s key provisions defining the
jurisdiction and powers of the three newly created categories of federal
courts. They are important because they dole out the “judicial power of the
United States” as specified in Article III—the legal authority of the three tiers
of newly created federal courts to decide cases and controversies brought
before them. The provisions are familiar enough to federal courts experts.
However, there is fresh insight to be gained from understanding how the
jurisdictions and powers were specified, and, more importantly, how the
different sections fit together. Too often, judges, lawyers, and scholars treat
the parts of the Judiciary Act of 1789 as if they were independent statutes
(e.g., the ATS or the Rules of Decision Act), rather than interlocking parts of
a single framework enactment.
1. District Court Original Jurisdiction
Section 9 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 detailed the subject matter
jurisdiction of the newly created district courts. Section 10 applied only to
the district courts in Kentucky and Maine (soon-to-be-independent parts of
Virginia and Massachusetts, respectively) and contained special provisions
for appeals and writs of errors from those courts but otherwise replicated the
six categories of jurisdiction specified in section 9. That section provided for
district court original jurisdiction as follows.
Jurisdiction exclusive of state courts for:
(1) “all crimes and offences . . . cognizable under the authority of the
United States, committed within their respective districts, or upon the
high seas” with punishment not to exceed thirty lashes, a one-hundreddollar fine, or six months’ imprisonment;
(2) “all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction,” including
seizures under U.S. “impost, navigation or trade” laws on navigable
waters or on the high seas, “saving to suitors, in all cases, the right of
a common law remedy, where the common law is competent to give
it”;
(3) “all seizures on land, or other waters than as aforesaid, made” for
penalties and forfeitures under U.S. laws; and
(4) “all suits against consuls or vice-consuls,” unless for crimes or
offenses exceeding “aforesaid” district court jurisdiction.89
Jurisdiction concurrent with state courts or the circuit courts “as the case
may be” for:
(5) “all causes where an alien sues for a tort only in violation of the law
of nations or a treaty of the United States”; and
88. 1 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789–
1800, at 21 (Maeva Marcus & James R. Perry eds., 1985) [hereinafter DHSC].
89. Ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. at 76–77.

1914

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 89

(6) “all suits at common law where the United States sue” and the amount
in dispute is up to one hundred dollars.90
Section 9 also provided that trial of issues of fact in the district courts “in all
causes except civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, shall be by
jury.”
2. Circuit Court Original Jurisdiction and Removal Jurisdiction
Section 11 extended the jurisdiction of the circuit courts exclusively of
state courts to “all crimes and offences cognizable under the authority of the
United States,” which was concurrent with the district courts as to the minor
offenses listed in section 9.91 And section 11 also gave jurisdiction
concurrently to the state courts over “all suits of a civil nature at common
law or in equity, where the matter in dispute exceeds” five hundred dollars
and the “United States are plaintiffs, or petitioners” or “an alien is party, or
the suit is between a citizen of the State where the suit is brought, and a
citizen of another State.” Section 11 further specified that the circuit courts
“shall also have appellate jurisdiction from the district courts under the
regulations and restrictions herein after provided.” Section 12 mimicked
section 11 and provided for removal to the circuit courts (or to a district court
in the Districts of Maine or Kentucky) for a suit “in any state court brought
against an alien, or by a citizen of the state in which the suit is brought against
the citizen of another state” when the matter in dispute exceeded five hundred
dollars.92
3. Supreme Court Original Jurisdiction and Other Powers
Section 13 doled out the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction set out in
Article III, Section 2 as follows:
For “all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and
Consuls” in Article III:
[T]he Supreme Court . . . . shall have exclusively all such jurisdiction of
suits or proceedings against ambassadors, or other public ministers, or their
domestics, or domestic servants, as a court of law can have or exercise
consistently with the law of nations; and original, but not exclusive
jurisdiction of all suits brought by ambassadors, or other public ministers,
or in which a consul, or vice consul, shall be a party.93

One interesting feature of this provision in the First Judiciary Act is that
the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction was exclusive as to all suits against
ambassadors or public ministers (or their family members or domestic
servants) but concurrent, presumably with state courts, for all suits brought
by ambassadors or other public ministers. And although the Article III
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id.
Id. § 11, 1 Stat. at 78–79.
Id. § 12, 1 Stat. at 79–80.
Id. § 13, 1 Stat. at 80–81.
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provisions mention “consuls” in the same phrase as ambassadors and other
public ministers, the First Judiciary Act distinguishes them. As we have seen,
section 9 provided for district court original jurisdiction, exclusive of state
courts, for civil suits “against consuls or vice consuls”94 in conjunction with
section 13’s provision for concurrent original jurisdiction in the Supreme
Court as to “all suits . . . in which a consul, or vice consul, shall be a party,”
whether plaintiff or defendant. As I have explained in previous work, this
was because consuls and vice consuls were not full-fledged diplomats under
the law of nations like ambassadors or ministers but rather agents of foreign
sovereigns who watched over their subjects or citizens and their commercial
interests.95 In the late eighteenth century, consuls were usually based in the
commercial port cities where the district courts were located, making these
courts a logical choice for consular litigation. Moreover, many consuls and
vice consuls in the United States were actually U.S. citizens who undertook
to represent the interests of a foreign state with which they had a personal
connection or commercial interests. Regardless, ambassadors, public
ministers, and consuls or vice consuls alike were surely not intended to be
covered by the word “alien” in the separate ATS provision of section 9,
because they had public or quasi-public status and were thus separately and
explicitly provided for in the First Judiciary Act. This is an important point
often overlooked in commentary on the ATS that becomes self-evident when
one scrutinizes the different jurisdictional provisions of the Act together.
For “those in which a State shall be Party”:
That the Supreme Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction of all
controversies of a civil nature, where a state is a party, except between a
state and its citizens; and except also between a state and citizens of other
states, or aliens, in which latter case it shall have original but not exclusive
jurisdiction.96

In prior work, I argued that the state-as-party half of the Supreme Court’s
Article III original jurisdiction included suits brought by a foreign “state as
party” against one or more U.S. states for treaty violations, most notably of
the 1783 Treaty of Peace with Great Britain.97 That foreign relations function
would have increased the essential role of this aspect of the Court’s original
jurisdiction in the original constitutional plan for the federal judiciary. And
we have already examined how Article IX of the Articles of Confederation
94. Id. § 9, 1 Stat. at 76–77.
95. See Lee, supra note 4, at 855–63.
96. Ch. 20, § 13, 1 Stat. at 80–81.
97. See Thomas H. Lee, The Supreme Court of the United States as Quasi-international
Tribunal: Reclaiming the Court’s Original and Exclusive Jurisdiction over Treaty-Based
Suits Brought by Foreign States Against States, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1765, 1768 (2004)
(asserting that the Constitution “vests in the Supreme Court original and exclusive jurisdiction
over suits against States brought by foreign states alleging violation of ratified treaties of the
United States”). I argued that this original jurisdiction survives the passage of the Eleventh
Amendment and subsequent Supreme Court precedents, including Principality of Monaco v.
Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934). See id. at 1770–75.
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provided for this important jurisdiction to decide controversies between
states.98 On a textualist note, the antecedent of “those” would appear to be
“all Cases,” as used in the “affecting Ambassadors” part of the original
jurisdiction clause, but, as noted above, the word “Controversies,” not “all
Cases,” is used in Article III, Section 2’s enumeration of the disputes in
which a state might be party. Section 13 of the Judiciary Act, in turn, uses
the phrase “all controversies of a civil nature.”
Section 13 also specified that “the trial of issues in fact in the Supreme
Court, in all actions at law against citizens of the United States, shall be by
jury.”99 That the Judiciary Act’s specification of the Supreme Court’s
original jurisdiction provided for jury trials to any degree100 suggests that the
Court’s original jurisdiction was viewed as identical to the original
jurisdiction of the district and circuit courts. The only differences were the
more exalted status of the forum and the number of judges—a quorum of six,
as opposed to three or one. The Supreme Court’s exercise of its original
jurisdiction today, however, is very different from that of the lower courts,
particularly in that fact-finding is done by a special master, not by jury.
Article III does not say anything one way or the other, of course. Moreover,
Congress no longer provides for exclusive original jurisdiction in the
Supreme Court for suits by states against citizens of the United States (or
actions against ambassadors or public ministers).101
As a textual matter, the state-as-party provision in section 13 may be read
to encompass suits brought by citizens of other states or aliens against a state.
If so, then it would have possibly permitted suit in the Supreme Court’s
original jurisdiction by these private plaintiffs pleading state violations of the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. This would have enabled
a powerful tool of Supreme Court judicial review of state laws. But the
Eleventh Amendment—proposed by Congress in 1794 and declared to be
part of the Constitution in 1798—explicitly foreclosed such suits.
Section 13 additionally spelled out the Supreme Court’s judicial powers
outside of its mandatory original jurisdiction. Section 13 provided that the
“Supreme Court shall also have appellate jurisdiction from the circuit courts
and courts of the several states, in the cases herein after specially provided
98. See supra Parts I.A.3–4.
99. Ch. 20, § 13, 1 Stat. at 80–81.
100. An account of the only reported jury trial at the Supreme Court, Georgia v. Brailsford,
3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 1 (1794), surmises that the jury was a Mansfieldian “special jury” culled from
a venire of merchants with specialized knowledge regarding the contesting claims between
Georgia and a British private creditor as to a 1774 bond owed by a Georgia citizen. See
Lochlan F. Shelfer, Special Juries in the Supreme Court, 123 YALE L.J. 208, 211 (2013).
101. See 28 U.S.C. § 1251(b). The statutory specification of the Court’s original
jurisdiction is now not only nonexclusive, it extends only to “actions or proceedings to which
ambassadors, other public ministers, consuls, or vice consuls of foreign states are parties.” Id.
§ 1251(b)(1). There are, I suppose, plausible arguments that Supreme Court original
jurisdiction that is nonexclusive jurisdiction but never in fact exercised offends the holding in
Marbury that Congress may not alter the Court’s original jurisdiction, and that the present
specification does not cover “all Cases affecting” foreign ambassadors, ministers, and consuls,
such as those involving their families and domestic servants as set forth in section 13 of the
First Judiciary Act.
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for.”102 A separate provision in section 13 also granted the Supreme Court
power “to issue writs of prohibition to the district courts, when proceeding
as courts of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.” Finally, it authorized the
Court to issue “writs of mandamus, in cases warranted by the principles and
usages of law, to any courts appointed, or persons holding office, under the
authority of the United States.”103 This mandamus provision was famously
held to be unconstitutional in Marbury, on the view that it enlarged the
Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction, which Congress lacked the power to
do because Article III’s specification could not be altered.104
Section 14 gave all federal courts the “power to issue writs of scire facias,
habeas corpus, and all other writs not specially provided for by statute which
may be necessary for the exercise of their respective jurisdictions, and
agreeable to the principles and usages of law.”105 The power of Supreme
Court Justices and district court judges to grant writs of habeas corpus under
section 14, however, was limited to prisoners in custody under federal
authority, or committed to trial or necessary for testimony in federal court.
4. Equity Jurisdiction
Section 16 provided that “suits in equity shall not be sustained in . . . the
courts of the United States, in any case where plain, adequate and complete
remedy may be had at law.”106 Section 19 provided that “it shall be the duty
of circuit courts, in causes in equity and of admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction, to cause the facts on which they found their sentence or decree,
fully to appear upon the record.”107 Notwithstanding section 16’s
requirement of first resort to remedies at law, equity causes were important
in land grant cases, a prominent and important category of cases in federal
courts in the late eighteenth century.
5. Circuit and Supreme Court Appellate Jurisdiction from Federal Courts
Sections 21 and 22 provided the specifics regarding appellate jurisdiction
from district court to circuit court, as promised in section 11. Section 21
provided that “from final decrees in a district court in causes of admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction, where the matter in dispute exceeds the sum or value
of three hundred dollars . . . an appeal shall be allowed to the next circuit
court, to be held in such district.”108 Section 22 provided that
final decrees and judgments in civil actions in a district court, where the
matter in dispute exceeds the sum or value of fifty dollars . . . may be reexamined, and reversed or affirmed in a circuit court . . . upon a writ of
error . . . . And upon a like process, may final judgments and decrees in
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Ch. 20, § 13, 1 Stat. at 80–81.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 173–80 (1803).
Ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. at 81–82.
Id. § 16, 1 Stat. at 82–83.
Id. § 19, 1 Stat. at 83.
Id. § 21, 1 Stat. at 83–84.
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civil actions, and suits in equity in a circuit court . . . where the matter in
dispute exceeds the sum or value of two thousand dollars . . . be reexamined and reversed or affirmed in the Supreme Court . . . . But there
shall be no reversal in either court on such writ of error for error in ruling
any plea in abatement, other than a plea to the jurisdiction of the court, or
such plea to a petition or bill in equity, as is in the nature of a demurrer, or
for any error in fact.109

Section 4 separately provided that “no district judge shall give a vote in any
case of appeal or error from his own decision; but may assign the reasons of
such his decision.”110 Interestingly, there was no similar disqualification in
the Judiciary Act for Supreme Court Justices from voting in cases of appeal
or error from their own circuit court decisions, perhaps because it would have
left the six-Justice Court shorthanded in too many cases.
Section 22 refers to both civil actions and equity suits, permitting review
upon writ of error to the Supreme Court. Strangely, section 21 does not
explicitly provide for “appeal” to the Supreme Court from a circuit court in
admiralty and maritime cases after an appeal to the circuit court from a
district court. (Nor is there any appeal to the Supreme Court in criminal
cases.) Section 13 separately authorized the Supreme Court to issue writs of
prohibition to the district courts “when proceeding as courts of admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction.”111 That writ gave the Court the power to stop the
district courts from going ahead with exercising jurisdiction in an admiralty
or maritime case upon a successful petition for the writ. But any appeal of
issues decided by the district court in an admiralty or maritime case would
lie only to the circuit court under section 21, subject to the three-hundreddollar amount-in-controversy requirement. Regardless, the Supreme Court
from the start entertained writs of error from the circuit courts in admiralty
and maritime cases, and so the absence of reference to appeals or writs of
error in such cases seems to be a drafting oversight.
6. Supreme Court Appellate Jurisdiction from State Courts
Section 25 detailed the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction from the
state courts:
That a final judgment or decree in any suit, in the highest court of law or
equity of a State in which a decision in the suit could be had, where is drawn
in question the validity of a treaty or statute of, or an authority exercised
under the United States, and the decision is against their validity . . . may
be re-examined and reversed or affirmed in the Supreme Court of the
United States upon a writ of error . . . . But no other error shall be assigned
or regarded as a ground of reversal in any such case as aforesaid, than such
as appears on the face of the record, and immediately respects the before

109. Id. § 22, 1 Stat. at 84–85.
110. Id. § 4, 1 Stat. at 74–75.
111. Id. § 13, 1 Stat. at 80–81.
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mentioned questions of validity or construction of the said constitution,
treaties, statutes, commissions, or authorities in dispute.112

Section 25 did not provide for any reexamination by the Court upon a writ
of error with respect to a judgment or decree from the highest state court in a
suit in which the state court had decided in favor of the validity of a treaty,
statute, or authority of the United States. Additionally, any reexamination by
the Supreme Court was limited to error that appeared “on the face of the
record” and “immediately respects” the validity of the federal treaty, statute,
or authority in dispute. And, most importantly, review was by “writ of error,”
not “appeal,” foreclosing the possibility of any reexamination of facts,
whether by jury or judge. Consequently, the First Congress strongly
implemented its Article III, Section 2 power to “make” “exceptions” and
“regulations” to the Supreme Court’s “appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law
and Fact,” which had occasioned such hostility in the state ratifying
conventions.113 This exceedingly narrow specification of the Court’s
appellate jurisdiction from the state courts lasted until 1867.
7. Rules of Decision Act
But what law would the new federal courts apply in their exercise of the
Article III judicial powers that the First Congress had vested in them in the
Judiciary Act of 1789? Section 34 of the First Judiciary Act—the Rules of
Decision Act—prescribed that “the laws of the several states, except where
the constitution, treaties or statutes of the United States shall otherwise
require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at common
law in the courts of the United States in cases where they apply.”114 For a
century after its 1842 decision in Swift v. Tyson,115 the Supreme Court
construed section 34 to include “strictly local” state laws, including statutes
(and the “construction thereof adopted by local tribunals”) as well as “rights
and titles” pertaining to real property or other “intraterritorial” matters but
not to “questions of general commercial law.”116 But in 1938, the Court in
Erie, relying in part on Charles Warren’s interpretation of the Senate bill
version of section 34, held that “laws of the several states” included all state
judicial decisions and that federal courts did not have the power to invoke
“general law” as rules of decision when their judicial power was based on the
Article III, Section 2 grant as to controversies “between citizens of different
States.”117 That was, of course, only one of the nine grants of judicial power,
112. Id. § 25, 1 Stat. at 85–86.
113. In theory, until the ratification of the Re-examination Clause of the Seventh
Amendment in December 1791, the Court might have still reexamined and reversed jury factfindings challenged by writ of error from the highest law court of a state so long as an error
appeared “on the face of the record.” But there is no evidence that this was ever attempted or
done in any of the handful of Supreme Court cases docketed in 1791.
114. Ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. at 92 (Rules of Decision Act).
115. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), overruled by Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938).
116. Id. at 18–19.
117. Erie, 304 U.S. at 72–73, 73 n.5.

1920

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 89

however, and all of the other grants implicated the law of nations either
directly or indirectly to the extent that the law of nations was a source for the
U.S. law of interstate relations.118 It is not my intent to delve at length into
the rich and complex debates regarding the Erie doctrine; it suffices for
present purposes to note that section 34 had two important limitations: it
only applied to “trials at common law” and only then “in cases where [the
laws of the several states] apply.”119 In other words, state laws, whether
statutes or judicial decisions, did not apply in equity causes or in admiralty
and maritime suits in federal court and might in theory not “apply” even in
“trials at common law.” State rules of decision were thus the exception, not
the norm, for the small set of suits in federal courts under the original plan of
1787–1792, a point Wilfred Ritz has made.120 That is consistent with the
reality that the original and removal jurisdictions of the federal courts were
so limited, as elaborated in detail above, precisely to preserve state court
concurrent jurisdiction.
Four summary points may be made about the design and implementation
of the federal courts contained in the Judiciary Act of 1789. First, it is
important to get an integrated understanding of how all the specifications of
the judicial power were implemented. Take the ATS for example. The
Supreme Court in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain121 concluded that the ATS was
originally enacted to address three late eighteenth-century paradigm law-ofnations violations—piracy, attacks against ambassadors, and violations of
safe conducts.122 Given that the ATS is a part of section 9 that gives
concurrent jurisdiction to state and circuit courts, and a different clause of
section 9 gives the district courts exclusive admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction subject to the saving-to-suitors clause, it is implausible to assert
that the ATS had anything to do with piracy. Furthermore, section 13 gave
the Supreme Court “original, but not exclusive jurisdiction of all suits
brought by ambassadors,” with the implication that concurrent jurisdiction
would be exercised not by district courts in the diverse states but by the courts
of the state or district of the national capital (first New York and then the
District of Columbia), where ambassadors were received and restricted
unless given freedom of movement by the president. The ATS, by contrast,
specified district court jurisdiction concurrent with state and circuit courts.
118. See Thomas H. Lee, The Law of Nations and the Judicial Branch, 106 GEO. L.J. 1707,
1709 (2018) (“The law of nations was the original federal common law. By this I mean that
the law of nations was to be the default source of rules of decision for federal courts to apply
in cases and controversies before them ‘except where the constitution, treaties or statutes of
the United States otherwise require or provide,’ pursuant to parts of all nine grants of judicial
power in Article III . . . .” (quoting ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. at 92)).
119. Ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. at 92.
120. See generally WILFRED J. RITZ, REWRITING THE HISTORY OF THE JUDICIARY ACT OF
1789: EXPOSING MYTHS, CHALLENGING PREMISES, AND USING NEW EVIDENCE (Wythe Holt &
L. H. LaRue eds., 1990).
121. 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
122. Id. at 724 (finding “no basis to suspect Congress had any examples in mind beyond
those torts corresponding to Blackstone’s three primary offenses [of the law of nations]:
violation of safe conducts, infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy”).
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The upshot is that the ATS was enacted solely to address safe-conducts and
did not address piracy or ambassadorial infringements at all.123 That
conclusion only becomes obvious by a careful examination of all the
jurisdictional provisions of the First Judiciary Act together, not just the ATS
clause in section 9.
Second, the original jurisdiction of the new federal courts was exceedingly
narrow in comparison to what Article III authorized in terms of the judicial
power of the United States. The district courts had exclusive original
jurisdiction over: (1) low-level federal crimes and seizures on land or inland
waters, applying the Article III arising under judicial power; (2) civil causes
in admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, which included maritime seizures
under U.S. customs laws (subject to the saving-to-suitors clause), implicating
the Article III admiralty and maritime power; and (3) suits against consuls or
vice consuls, implicating the Article III power as to all cases “affecting
ambassadors, public ministers, or consuls.”124 And they had concurrent
original jurisdiction when the United States was plaintiff and less than one
hundred dollars was at issue, involving the Article III United States-as-party
power; and for alien tort claims, for which the United States bore sovereign
responsibility, since it owed a duty of protection to friendly and neutral
aliens, under treaties and the law of nations, implicating the Article III arising
under power.125 The circuit courts had exclusive federal crime jurisdiction,
implicating the arising under power; ATS jurisdiction concurrent with the
district courts; original and removal jurisdiction concurrent with the state
courts of “all suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity” exceeding
five hundred dollars when the “United States are plaintiffs or petitioners,”
applying part of the Article III United States-as-party power; and jurisdiction
when “an alien is party, or the suit is between a citizen of the State where the
suit is brought, and a citizen of another State,” implicating the foreign and
citizen diversity headings of Article III.126 And the Supreme Court’s original
jurisdiction, as we have seen, was confined exclusively to ambassadorial and
state-as-party cases, hewing closely to the two halves of the Article III
original jurisdiction clause.127 What is clear is that the First Congress was
exceedingly parsimonious in doling out land-based Article III power given
the concerns about encroachment on state judicial power and juries expressed
at the Constitutional Convention and the state ratification conventions.
Third, although Article III authorized “appellate” jurisdiction “both as to
Law and Fact” in the wide-ranging sense of the Court of Appeals in Cases of
Capture under the Articles, the First Congress did not follow the lead of the
Continental Congress on such jurisdiction. The Judiciary Act, in sections 22
and 25, severely limited the Supreme Court to review by writ of error in civil
123. See Lee, supra note 4, at 836 (concluding that the “ATS was enacted to allow aliens
to sue in federal district court for only one of the three violations Sosa identified, namely
transgressions of safe conducts”).
124. See ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. at 76–77.
125. See id.
126. See id. §§ 11–12, 1 Stat. at 78–80.
127. See supra notes 93–99 and accompanying text.
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actions and equity suits from the lower federal courts and the highest state
courts of law and equity, the latter only as to what was evident on the face of
the record and “immediately” respecting the validity of a federal law or
authority that the state court had struck down. In fact, there was no explicit
provision made as to Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction as to admiralty
and maritime cases from the district courts, nor any appellate jurisdiction
from state court decisions that upheld federal treaties, statutes, or authorities.
The creation of lower federal courts that were optional to Congress under
Article III may have mitigated the perceived need for such appellate
jurisdiction. But whatever the reason, the First Congress aggressively
exercised its Article III, Section 2 power to “make” exceptions to the
Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction.
At the same time, Congress went very broad in implementing the Supreme
Court’s Article III original jurisdiction for “all Cases affecting Ambassadors,
public Ministers, and Consuls” and for when a state is a party. For instance,
in section 13 of the Judiciary Act, Congress provided for exclusive original
jurisdiction in the Supreme Court for cases involving an ambassador’s
“domestics, or domestic servants” and extended nonexclusive original
jurisdiction to vice consuls, a largely honorific quasi-diplomatic position that
was arguably not within Article III’s specification of “all Cases affecting
Ambassadors, other public Ministers, and Consuls.” The contrast in these
two aspects of the First Judiciary Act’s doling out of the Supreme Court’s
jurisdiction—appellate versus original—confirms the sense that the First
Congress believed that the Constitution required thorough vesting of the
Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction, particularly as compared to its
parsimonious vesting of appellate jurisdiction, particularly of state courts.
Finally, it bears noting how much the Judiciary Act’s specifications of
judicial power were oriented to the foreign policy picture and to providing
dispute resolution favorable to foreign emissaries and merchants, particularly
in the maritime setting. There was little evident interest in bringing the newly
created federal courts to bear for domestic governance concerns or the
vindication of Americans’—as opposed to foreigners’—rights, outside of the
enclaves of federal crimes and U.S. enforcement actions (e.g., land seizures
for customs collection or habeas corpus when in federal custody) and
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. Indeed, the only land-based resort to
federal judicial power that a U.S. citizen-plaintiff could access, absent the
implication of a foreign party, seems to be the “Citizens of different States”
diversity jurisdiction,128 subject to a five-hundred-dollar amount-incontroversy requirement.
In addition to the establishment of the Supreme Court and the lower federal
courts and the specifications of judicial power, the First Judiciary Act also

128. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
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set forth some basic rules of evidence129 and jury selection.130 However, it
did not otherwise address procedures to be used in the new federal courts,
including whether they were to proceed as a general matter under the
procedural rules then in use in England and in the states.
E. The First Process Act
The First Congress tackled the vital lacuna of procedures in the Judiciary
Act in an enactment that became law five days later, on September 29, 1789.
This statute was titled “An Act to regulate Processes in the Courts of the
United States.”131 It originated in the same Senate committee of the First
Congress that had drafted the Judiciary Act. It was most likely drafted by
the same person who was the principal architect of the Judiciary Act, Senator
Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut, who was later appointed the third Chief
Justice of the United States.132
The First Process Act has not received the sort of scholarly attention one
might have expected for what was effectively the first federal civil procedure
statute. Part of this may be attributable to the fact that it was supposed to be
temporary—Congress provided that it was to “continue in force until the end
of the next session of Congress and no longer.”133 The statute proved to be
longer lived: the next two Congresses ended up voting to continue the
Process Act of 1789, and a new process act was not passed until May 8,
1792.134 Another reason for the low profile of the statute may be its
concision. The entire statute consists of 328 words in three sections.135 The
original Senate bill had been much more detailed, but the Senate pared it
down, ostensibly to prevent undue wrangling with the House of
Representatives.136
One major controversy was not averted, however. The original Senate bill
of the First Process Act had provided “[t]hat all Writs & Processes issuing
out of any of the Courts of the United States, shall be in the name of the
President of the United States of America.”137 Some senators chafed at this
whiff of the British king’s writs;138 such objections were joined by like129. Ch. 20, § 15, 1 Stat. at 82 (“[P]ower in the trial of actions at law, on motion and due
notice . . . to require the parties to produce books or writings in their possession or
power . . . .”); id. § 30, 1 Stat. at 88–90 (prescribing a uniform “mode of proof by oral
testimony and examination of witnesses in open court” and procedures for taking testimony
of distant persons).
130. Id. § 29, 1 Stat. at 88.
131. Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 21, 1 Stat. 93 (repealed 1792).
132. 4 DHSC, supra note 88, at 108.
133. Ch. 21, § 3, 1 Stat. at 94.
134. See 4 DHSC, supra note 88, at 112–13.
135. See ch. 21, 1 Stat. 93.
136. See 4 DHSC, supra note 88, at 110.
137. Id. at 115.
138. See, e.g., JOURNAL OF WILLIAM MACLAY: UNITED STATES SENATOR FROM
PENNSYLVANIA 1789–1791, at 166–67 (Edgar S. Maclay ed., New York, D. Appleton & Co.
1890) (Sept. 26, 1789) (“This is only a part of their old system of giving the President as far
as possible every appendage of royalty.”).
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minded members of the House. When the bill reached the House,
Representative Michael Jenifer Stone of Maryland moved to strike the words
“the President of” so that writs would run from the United States, in which
sovereignty rightfully reposed.139 A “warm and animated” debate resulted,
and the House passed Stone’s amendment by a 25 to 18 vote.140 But the
Senate stuck to its guns and rejected the House’s amended bill. The House
also refused to back down, voting 28 to 22 to press the amendment upon
return from the Senate.141 The impasse, on a matter that seems trivial to the
modern legal mind, was resolved only when the two bodies agreed not to say
anything at all about from whom writs and processes would issue. This
resolution punted the fraught issue to the newly created judiciary.142
The incident highlighted the hostility to implementing legal practices
redolent of British monarchy in the new national courts. The royal writ was
the key for litigants to unlock the king’s courts, and it was framed as a royal
command to the defendant or to the sheriff. The whole point of the American
War of Independence had been to slip the yoke of royal commands, and it
seemed antithetical to that purpose to substitute the command of a president
for that of a king. More generally, a significant segment of the American
people had come to be wary of the political and legal institutions of the
country with which they had just fought a bloody and vicious war of
separation. It was natural for them to seek other sources of inspiration for
designing the revolutionary republic’s governance institutions, including its
courts. One important such source was the practices of the various states, but
those were also ultimately derived from English common-law models. The
only other plausible source was the civil law tradition, descended from
Roman law, which had an important enclave in the British admiralty courts.
The controversy over who originates writs illuminates how the design of
the new republic’s legal practices sought departures from English legal
tradition in certain respects, but it was small beer compared to another part
of the First Process Act, which directly invoked the civil law tradition. The
statute’s key operative provision does not set forth actual procedural rules
but rather, ordains choices of procedural law for the three categories of cases
expected to constitute the main business of the new federal courts: (1) suits
at common law, (2) causes of equity, and (3) suits in admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction. The latter two categories in fact would come to constitute the
lion’s share of the work of the early national courts, which is unsurprising
since the state courts had concurrent jurisdiction over all suits at common
law. With respect to equity causes and maritime and admiralty suits, the
Process Act prescribed that “the forms and modes of proceedings . . . shall
be according to the course of the civil law.”143 As we shall see, it is almost
certain that the First Congress was directing federal judges to apply
139. 4 DHSC, supra note 88, at 110, 112.
140. Id. at 112.
141. Id.
142. The Justices of the Supreme Court, in their first term of February 1790, decided that
their writs would run from the president of the United States. See id.
143. Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 21, § 2, 1 Stat. 93, 93–94 (repealed 1792) (emphasis added).
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procedural rules according to the evolving practice of civilian courts like the
British admiralty courts and continental European courts, not the rules of the
state courts or of the English common-law courts. This is an astonishing and
little-remarked innovation.
Before discussing the puzzling provision, we need to address the
preliminary question of why Congress chose to vest multiple judicial powers
in the same court. A fusion of judicial powers in one court (law and equity)
was a common feature in civil law countries (including Scotland), but it was
anathema in England. The common-law courts were the masters of law, and
the Court of Chancery was the dispenser of equity. The splitting into two of
the rule-of-law atom was an axiom of the English legal order but foreign to
the civil law legal order. The two institutions evolved a long and famous
history of mutual suspicion and rivalry, and the English believed that
combining them in one organ was a dangerous fusion of power.144 But that
was what the First Congress did,145 and in an even greater departure from the
English example, they also vested the new national courts with the allimportant admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, which had been the separate
province of the civilian admiralty courts in England.146
It is unclear exactly why the business of three courts in England (the
common-law courts, Chancery, and the admiralty courts) was put into one
new national court in the United States,147 so it is hard to say for sure if the
Framers were influenced by the civilian norm of a unitary court with law and
equity powers. James Pfander and Daniel Birk have read the constitutional
extension of “judicial power . . . to all Cases, in Law and Equity” in Article
III, Section 2 as pointing to a unitary court influenced by the civilian-based
Scottish model,148 but that provision does not have to be read to mean that
“all Cases, in Law and Equity” requires vesting both law and equity cases in
the same court. The First Congress could have created law courts and equity
courts and still been in compliance with Article III.
Although the Constitution does not require it, the First Congress did fuse
common-law and equity powers, along with the admiralty and maritime
power, in one system of courts through the First Judiciary Act. The trifold
fusion inspired strong objections based on the English example, including

144. Limited border crossings were common, however. For instance, litigants in the
common-law courts could obtain bills of discovery from Chancery to aid litigation. See JOHN
H. LANGBEIN ET AL., HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW: THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANGLOAMERICAN LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 361 (2009).
145. But see Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 16, 1 Stat. 73, 82 (limiting the reach of equity
by providing “[t]hat suits in equity shall not be sustained in either of the courts of the United
States, in any case where plain, adequate, and complete remedy may be had at law”).
146. See id. § 9, 1 Stat. at 76–77.
147. See 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 428 (noting that William Samuel Johnson
suggested the merger of law and equity).
148. See James E. Pfander & Daniel D. Birk, Article III and the Scottish Judiciary, 124
HARV. L. REV. 1613, 1666–69 (2011) (suggesting that the Framers were influenced by Lord
Kames’s exposition of the merits of the Scottish unitary model).
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from future Justice Samuel Chase.149 My own view is that Congress may
have overridden such objections not necessarily out of a desire to emulate the
Scottish or civilian model but because they wanted to create a compact
judiciary to save money and mitigate the fear that the new courts would
transgress the business of the state courts. For instance, Robert Treat Paine,
a future justice of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, wrote to Caleb
Strong, a member of the Senate committee that originated the bill, and
“suggested combining the admiralty and revenue jurisdictions rather than
having them referred to separate courts.”150 The fact that the First Congress
seems to have thought they had the discretion to combine or not to combine
suggests, contrary to Pfander’s and Birk’s theory, that Article III’s reference
to “Cases, in Law and Equity” is inconclusive on a requirement of unity.
But let us return to the main event of the choices made by the First Process
Act. It prescribed two choices of procedural law: one for the common-law
causes of action and one for equity causes and admiralty and maritime suits
combined. Before discussing the specific prescriptions, it is useful to
consider the range of possible choices. The First Congress could have: (1)
applied state procedural rules; (2) drafted their own procedural rules by
statute; (3) allowed the federal judiciary to make their own rules; or (4)
adopted the rules of the English courts—common law, equity, and admiralty.
For the law side, the Senate had originally passed a bill prescribing
procedural rules (option two) with a carveout for state rules as to “executions
in actions” and fees,151 but Congress ended up choosing state rules (option
one). To be specific, with respect to “suits at common law,” the First Process
Act declared that “except where . . . otherwise provided” by federal statutes,
“the forms of writs and executions . . . and modes of process and rates of
fees . . . in the circuit and district courts . . . shall be the same in each state
respectively as are now used or allowed in the supreme courts of the
same.”152 The choice of state procedural law for suits at law was
unsurprising: each of the new states had their own settled common-law
courts, which had evolved particular ways of regulating procedures. The
local bar would not have welcomed a new set of rules for actions at law that
might be entertained in the local federal courts too, for instance by virtue of
diversity jurisdiction. This part of the First Process Act also tracked the Rule
of Decisions Act’s prescription of state substantive law “in trials at common
law in the courts of the United States in cases where they apply.”153 The law
side of the statute has been the subject of a good deal of judicial and scholarly
commentary, most notably for its quixotic, static command that the relevant
state procedures were those “now used or allowed” in 1789 and implicitly
not thereafter.154
149. See Maeva Marcus & Natalie Wexler, The Judiciary Act of 1789: Political
Compromise or Constitutional Interpretation?, in ORIGINS, supra note 6, at 13, 19.
150. Id.
151. 4 DHSC, supra note 88, at 115–18.
152. Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 21, § 2, 1 Stat. 93, 93 (repealed 1792).
153. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 73, 92.
154. Ch. 21, § 2, 1 Stat. at 93–94.
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It is the other choice of procedural law in the First Process Act for equity
causes and admiralty and maritime suits that is surprising. Neither the
original Senate bill nor the final act adopted one of the four logical options
suggested above. Instead, for “causes of equity, and of admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction,” section 2 of the Process Act prescribed that “the forms
and modes of proceedings . . . shall be according to the course of the civil
law.” One threshold interpretive question is whether the phrase “according
to the course of the civil law” contemplated reference to the English
Chancery Court with respect to equity causes. Chancery had civilian roots,
but unlike the ecclesiastical and admiralty courts, it had evolved a distinct
identity in England by the late eighteenth century. Although, it is almost
certain that Chancery practice would not have been characterized as
“common law” procedure, it seems improbable that Congress and early
American lawyers would have viewed it as part of “the course of the civil
law.” Thus, despite the model of Chancery practice, it appears that these
words in the Process Act directed the new national courts to use the Romanlaw-based procedural rules of continental Europe and Scotland to govern
their “forms and modes of proceeding” in equity, as well as in admiralty and
maritime suits. With respect to maritime and admiralty suits, the English
admiralty courts were civilian institutions and so they were already applying
civil law procedures, although inflected by local usage over the decades.
Why did the First Congress opt for Roman-law-based, civil law procedures
in equity, admiralty, and maritime jurisdiction suits? Goebel posed a theory
of negative motive: the choice of civil law was due to postwar hostility
against English practice in the Court of Chancery and admiralty courts.155
“The Committee had earlier experienced the explosions over adopting
English chancery practice during the Judiciary Act debates . . . and it may
have been conceived that something less contentious was being tendered.”156
English law did seem like the most logical choice: American lawyers knew
it, and it promised a benefit comparable to civil law in terms of uniform rules
across the states and with England. State rules, as on the law side, were also
plausible in theory, although the more flexible nature of equity made it likely
that procedures had evolved greater differences over time among the states.
Another problem with using state rules was that there were separate courts of
chancery in only five of the then states—Maryland, New Jersey, New York,
South Carolina, and Virginia—and their rules were modeled on English
chancery anyway.157 Goebel does not shirk from expressing his opinion of
the provision for civil law practice actually enacted: he called it “done in
haste,” “ill advised,” and “unrealistic.”158 He believed it was “idle to suppose
that the judges or the practitioners . . . were likely to set afoot unfamiliar and
untried procedures.”159
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

See 1 GOEBEL, supra note 12, at 534–35.
Id. at 534.
Id.
Id. at 534–35.
Id. at 534.
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Goebel is surely correct about anti-English sentiment, but his negative
theory may be incomplete because it neglects an important positive motive:
the First Congress imported the “course of the civil law” to govern
procedures for equity and admiralty suits in federal court because they
wanted to encourage continental European merchants—Dutch, French,
Prussian—who were more familiar with civilian procedures derived from
Roman law, to trade and do business with, and lend money to, Americans.
Such dealings, especially with denizens of a new revolutionary “republic”
run by former freedom fighters and led by their general, are always haunted
by the specter of unreliable dispute resolution in the developing country’s
courts if the deals falter. The state courts, with their partisan juries and arcane
procedures of English origin, were notoriously hostile to foreign and out-ofstate commercial interests, particularly creditors.160
To counteract this reality, Congress tried to make the new general courts
as cosmopolitan and user-friendly as possible for continental European
merchants, shippers, and bankers. The First Process Act prescribed “forms
and modes of proceedings” in equity, maritime, and admiralty suits
“according to the course of the civil law.”161 And of course there was no jury
in equity, maritime, or admiralty, suits. By the expansion of equity,
maritime, and admiralty jurisdiction, the national courts might further erode
local juries, a concern that animated the saving-to-suitors clause of the
admiralty jurisdiction grant.162 Furthermore, as noted above, the Judiciary
Act gave foreigners special access to the federal courts for injuries to their
persons or properties (alien torts) that Americans did not have.163 Finally, in
“cases of foreign bills of exchange,” the First Judiciary Act accorded a
special right to serve process on a defendant in a district other than where he
lived or was served and for an assignee of a promissory note to sue in federal
court even if the assignor could not have.164 The former was the earliest
example of a nationwide process rule, which today is limited to federal
question suits,165 although a modern analogue would likely be constitutional
160. See Wythe Holt, “To Establish Justice”: Politics, the Judiciary Act of 1789, and the
Invention of the Federal Courts, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1421, 1449–50, 1450 n.94.
161. Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 21, § 2, 1 Stat. 93, 93–94 (repealed 1792).
162. “[T]he district courts . . . shall also have exclusive original cognizance of all civil
causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction . . . within their respective districts as well as
upon the high seas; . . . saving to suitors, in all cases, the right of a common law remedy, where
the common law is competent to give it . . . .” Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73,
76–77.
163. See Lee, supra note 4, at 882.
164. Specifically, section 11 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 provided:
[N]o civil suit shall be brought [in federal court] against an inhabitant of the United
States, by any original process in any other district than that whereof he is an
inhabitant, or in which he shall be found at the time of serving the writ, nor shall
any district or circuit court have cognizance of any suit to recover the contents of
any promissory note or other chose in action in favour of an assignee, unless a suit
might have been prosecuted in such court to recover the said contents if no
assignment had been made, except in cases of foreign bills of exchange.
Ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. at 78–79.
165. See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(2).
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under the Fifth Amendment, because the defendant would be a U.S. resident
with “minimum contacts” with the United States. Process served by state
courts was necessarily limited by the borders of the relevant state; the
creation of a national court system that enabled nationwide process posed a
real risk of inconvenience and cost to American defendants who would
strongly prefer to be sued, if at all, near home. The nationwide process and
assignment exceptions for “foreign bills of exchange” in the Judiciary Act
are, accordingly, consistent with the theme of preferential treatment and
privileges in federal court for foreign merchants and creditors in suits against
Americans. This accommodation of foreign European interests with respect
to procedural rules complemented the Rules of Decision Act’s implicit
reservation of decisional rules in equity, admiralty, and maritime suits to
federal judicial discretion, because state substantive laws, presumptively
tending to favor in-state citizens, would only supply “rules of decision in
trials at common law . . . in cases where they apply.”166
By way of postscript, Goebel was right. Lawyers resented the innovation
and persisted in settled ways. The provision drew intense fire from the first
U.S. attorney general, Edmund Randolph, who emphatically expressed his
concerns in a 1790 report to the House of Representatives:
A diversity of opinion has prevailed on the forms and modes, to be
observed in causes of equity and of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction:
Whether they are to be according to the mere civil law, unqualified by the
usages of any modern nation, or under limitations?
If the untempered severity of the Roman law is to predominate, the rights
of property, and of personal liberty, are in jeopardy: Without exhibiting a
tedious list of what are termed the substantial and accidental parts of a civil
cause, let a few of the most obnoxious forms of the civil law be selected.167

Randolph’s problems with civilian procedure included its overreliance on
oaths, the relative ease with which arrests could be made and property
sequestered, its practice of turning an estate over to a plaintiff to satisfy
judgment, and the “insult” to a judge countenanced by automatic grants of
dilatory exceptions in proceedings without a trial to enforce a schedule on
the litigants and the judge.168 These do appear to have been aspects of civil
law procedure, and it is impressive that Randolph knew them well enough to
criticize real drawbacks of civilian practice vis-à-vis English equity. He
proposed replacing civil law procedures with English ones: “It cannot be
denied, that the nation, whose jurisprudence is the source of our own,
presents the best limitations; and that they ought to be adopted, until better
shall be devised.”169
Notwithstanding Randolph’s criticisms, “forms and modes of
proceedings . . . according to the course of the civil law” continued as the law
166. Ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. at 92.
167. EDMUND RANDOLPH, REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL TO
REPRESENTATIVES (1790), reprinted in 4 DHSC, supra note 88, at 128, 136.
168. See id.
169. Id. at 137.
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on the books governing equity, admiralty, and maritime suits in federal court
for two and a half more years. When the Second Congress met in October
1791, a revision was high on the agenda. The initial Senate committee
wanted to keep the law as it was, but the full Senate made a complete reversal
and changed it to “state practice.”170 Surprisingly, it was the House that
suggested the less state-deferential version that was enacted: “according to
the principles, rules, and usages which belong to Courts of equity” or courts
of admiralty, respectively.171 The lower courts were given “discretion” to
make “alterations and additions” to these rules that they deemed “expedient.”
And the Supreme Court was authorized to make “such regulations as [it] shall
think proper from time to time by rule to prescribe to any circuit or district
court concerning the same.”172 The formulation was deceptively general, for
it allowed lawyers to stick to the American and English procedural rules they
knew best.
F. The First Supreme Court Case
We have just seen how the First Congress adopted civil law procedures to
encourage European merchants to use the new national courts for dispute
resolution. It should be no surprise that the very first case with which the
Supreme Court had to grapple also involved international commerce. But
this time the issue was public debt: specifically, sovereign debt that the states
had incurred to finance the War of Independence. The national government,
led by Alexander Hamilton,173 would eventually implement a political
solution by assuming much of the state sovereign debt. In the meantime,
frustrated creditors contemplated their litigation options.
Vanstophorst v. Maryland,174 the first case on the docket of the Supreme
Court, showcased the most important constitutional question in the first
decade after ratification: whether the Constitution permitted foreign and outof-state private creditors to adjudicate state sovereign debt cases in the
Court.175 In their efforts to secure ratification of the Constitution, Alexander
Hamilton in Federalist No. 81 and James Madison and John Marshall at the
Virginia ratifying convention had asserted that the Article III enumeration of
judicial power as to “Controversies . . . between a State and Citizens of
another State . . . [or foreign] Citizens or subjects” did not extend to suits
against an unconsenting state in federal court.176 But a number of such suits
170. 4 DHSC, supra note 88, at 176–82.
171. Id. at 181.
172. Process Act, ch. 36, § 2, 1 Stat. 275, 276 (1792).
173. See REPORT RELATIVE TO A PROVISION FOR THE SUPPORT OF PUBLIC CREDIT (1790),
reprinted in 6 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 65 (Harold C. Syrett & Jacob E. Cooke
eds., 1962).
174. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 401 (1791).
175. See 5 DHSC, supra note 88, at 7–56.
176. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, at 487 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(proclaiming “[i]t is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an
individual without its consent”); see also 10 DHRC, supra note 72, at 1414 (relaying James
Madison’s opinion at the Virginia convention on June 20, 1788, that “[i]t is not in the power
of individuals to call any state into court”); id. at 1433 (reporting John Marshall remarked
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were quickly filed in the Supreme Court as soon as it was established. At
issue were two foundations of states’ sovereignty: their fiscal autonomy and
their political status in the new United States. If the Constitution authorized
the Court’s jurisdiction and the Court were to issue a judgment adverse to a
state, then payment would draw money out of the state’s treasury, which only
its legislature had the power to spend.177 And the very idea that the Court
could make a state answer before it on the plea of a foreign litigant was not
only an insult, but it was also not something the states had necessarily agreed
to when they accepted the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction over cases
“in which a State shall be party.”178
Vanstophorst involved loans to Maryland by two Dutch brothers, Jacob
and Nicolaas van Staphorst, who were money lenders in Amsterdam.179 In
March 1781, the Maryland legislature had appointed Matthew Ridley, a
British-born Baltimore merchant, to go to Europe to secure war loans. Six
months later, Ridley arrived in France where he was unsuccessful in
obtaining a sovereign-to-sovereign loan. In May 1782, Ridley went to
Holland and, two months later, came to an agreement with the van Staphorsts
for a line of credit for Maryland with repayment to be made by annual
shipments of a large, fixed amount of tobacco crop. The terms Ridley
negotiated were disastrous for Maryland: the contracts pegged tobacco at a
very low price and gave the van Staphorsts the option of buying any surplus
tobacco left over after repayment at the same low price.
Maryland tried for several years to renegotiate the improvident bargain to
no avail. The van Staphorsts, acting through an American agent, ultimately
sought leave to file suit against Maryland in the Supreme Court in the
February 1791 term, with the case docketed on March 3, 1791. For Chief
Justice John Jay, it was the second time that he was asked to decide the
controversy: he had been one of four arbitrators appointed by the parties to
try to resolve the dispute in 1786.180 The arbitration had been aborted when
the Maryland legislature voted to negotiate a settlement in 1787.

soon thereafter that “I see a difficulty in making a state defendant, which does not prevent its
being plaintiff”).
177. See Christine A. Desan, Contesting the Character of the Political Economy in the
Early Republic: Rights and Remedies in Chisholm v. Georgia, in THE HOUSE AND SENATE IN
THE 1790S, at 178, 212 (Kenneth R. Bowling & Donald R. Kennon eds., 2002).
178. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2. I have argued that the issue was very different when a
state was being asked to pay a debt owed to its own citizen—a question the Framers of the
national constitution would not have been inclined to address. See generally Thomas H. Lee,
Making Sense of the Eleventh Amendment: International Law and State Sovereignty, 96 NW.
U. L. REV. 1027 (2002).
179. See 5 DHSC, supra note 88, at 7–17.
180. The identity of the arbitrators indicates the importance of the dispute in the early
American Republic. Maryland picked as its arbitrators John Jay, then the Confederation’s
secretary of foreign affairs; and Robert R. Livingston, Jay’s predecessor as secretary of foreign
affairs and the chancellor of New York at the time. Id. at 14–15. The van Staphorsts chose
James Duane, the mayor of New York; and Rufus King, who was a Massachusetts delegate to
the Continental and Confederation Congresses, a future member of the Committee of Style of
the national Constitutional Convention, and a U.S. senator from New York. Id.
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Arbitration had been a common method of dispute resolution in England
among merchants and tradespeople, but it had been overshadowed in
England by the late eighteenth century on account of the primacy of the jury
and the common-law courts. It continued, however, as an important dispute
resolution mechanism among merchants engaged in foreign maritime trade
and commerce. A modern marker of this reality is that when Congress
enacted the Federal Arbitration Act,181 it did so under the admiralty and
maritime powers that had been inferred from Article III’s grant of admiralty
and maritime jurisdiction to the national courts.
The plea of Supreme Court original jurisdiction in Vanstophorst appeared
to have a sound constitutional textual basis. Article III extended the national
judicial power to “Controversies . . . between a State . . . and foreign . . .
Citizens” and also provided that “the supreme Court shall have original
jurisdiction” in cases “in which a State shall be Party.”182 Luther Martin,
Maryland’s very able attorney general and an ardent anti-Federalist during
the Constitutional Convention,183 did not initially file a reply on the state’s
behalf but later complied with the Court’s order to plead or face default
judgment.184 Since the key witnesses were in Holland, plaintiffs’ counsel,
Attorney General Edmund Randolph, acting in a private capacity, moved the
Court to appoint commissioners to conduct depositions there, pursuant to
section 30 of the Judiciary Act.185 Although a docket entry indicates that
these depositions were taken, the parties ended up settling and the case was
dismissed on August 6, 1792.186
What is most striking about Vanstophorst are the international and
thoroughly modern features of the controversy. The problem of enforcing
sovereign debt persists today on the international plane, as does the challenge
of designing a viable forum for dispute resolution of sovereign debt cases.187
The potential use of the Supreme Court was an ingenious attempt at a
solution: the Court—as an intermediate institution between foreign bankers
and individual state legislatures (a “quasi-international tribunal”)—promised
a “credibly neutral tribunal.”188 Accordingly, the question of whether Article
III of the Constitution contemplated such a tribunal was a difficult one. Legal
scholarship on these early constitutional cases usually emphasizes the
181. Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–15).
182. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
183. See MAIER, supra note 74, at 90–91. Martin arrived late at his state’s ratification
convention and said nothing, pleading laryngitis. Id. at 244.
184. The pleadings have not survived. It is likely that the plaintiffs filed a writ of assumpsit,
which was the writ filed in Chisolm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). James Sullivan,
attorney general of Massachusetts, reported that “[a] plea is filed to the action in common
form, that the state never promised.” 5 DHSC, supra note 88, at 22.
185. 5 DHSC, supra note 88, at 18; see also Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 30, 1 Stat. 73,
88.
186. See Fine Minutes of the Supreme Court (Aug. 6, 1792), reprinted in 1 DHSC, supra
note 88, at 200, 201.
187. See, e.g., Shane Romig, Ghana Ordered to Release Argentine Ship, WALL ST. J. (Dec.
15,
2012,
6:56
PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB10001424127887323297104578181382814430450 [https://perma.cc/UL4T-9N3W].
188. Lee, supra note 97, at 1783.
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sovereign immunity doctrinal features, which tend to obscure the thoroughly
modern larger policy implications and functional design motivations.
As Vanstophorst was winding down, a far more famous suit that was not
settled—Chisholm v. Georgia189—was making its way through the national
courts. Chisholm, too, involved state sovereign debt to an out-of-state
creditor. However, it did not implicate the more sensitive, structural problem
of foreign bankers with lines of credit extended to multiple states but rather,
a onetime past contract to an out-of-state American creditor. As such,
Chisholm accentuated the symbolic aspect of the state sovereign debt cases
and de-emphasized their systemic international political economy
ramifications. Both cases illustrate the importance of commercial cases in
the early years of the Supreme Court, a fact that we often forget today when
we are accustomed to the Court as a public law institution and as a
constitutional court, not as a court of international and interstate commerce.
II. ENLARGING CONVENTIONAL WISDOM
Part I sketched the basic contours of the original constitutional plan for the
newly created Supreme Court and federal court system based on the Articles
of Confederation, the Constitutional Convention, the language of Article III,
and the Judiciary Act and Process Act, both passed by the First Congress in
1789. It also examined the first case docketed at the Supreme Court, an
international state sovereign debt controversy. Part II applies that account of
the original constitutional plan for the federal courts to point out some ways
in which present-day conventional wisdom about the federal courts diverges
from the 1787–1792 plan.
A. Federal Courts Should Stay out of Foreign Affairs and Defer to the
Political Branches
We do not need to spend too much time on rebutting this conventional
wisdom: even a quick scan of Article III reveals the extent to which foreign
affairs were a focus of federal judicial power.190 The most important was the
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. The seas were the primary arena of
interaction between U.S. and foreign sovereign and private interests. Given
the importance of transatlantic commerce and trade to the fledgling United
States, maritime and admiralty jurisdiction was important in peacetime, thus
the need to provide a credible forum for dispute resolution of shipping
disputes. And it was also important in war, when disrupting this trade was
an essential part of any armed conflict involving the European powers.
Congress did have constitutional power, under Article I, Section 8, Clause
11, to “make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water,” and it did pass
statutes authorizing captures191 and regarding distribution of prize proceeds
189. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
190. See FLAHERTY, supra note 9, at 1–45; Lee, supra note 118, at 1730–36.
191. See, e.g., Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 170–71 (1804) (interpreting an act
of Congress that authorized the capture of any U.S. owned or chartered vessel bound for
French ports or under the employment of persons subject to French jurisdiction).
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to captains, officers, and crews. But Congress did not usually go into the
nuts and bolts of setting out the rules of maritime capture—e.g., when to
declare a blockade, the conditions under which captures were valid, how to
determine belligerent or neutral status, what private Americans could or
could not do to maintain neutrality, what was contraband that could be seized
off a neutral vessel in time of war, or what was condemnable cargo even if
not contraband under the doctrine of contamination.192 Such important and
fact-dependent issues were left to the federal courts to decide. The Supreme
Court’s decision in The Paquete Habana193 shows that this default foreign
policy role of federal judges was still well understood at the turn of the
twentieth century.
Another example of the capacious foreign affairs jurisdiction of the federal
courts in the original constitutional plan is the Supreme Court’s original
jurisdiction. Article III provides that the Supreme Court shall have original
jurisdiction “[i]n all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and
Consuls.”194 “Affecting” is a very expansive word. As it turned out, there
were not many cases involving ambassadors filed in the Supreme Court, but
the lack of such cases was certainly not by design. The other prong of the
Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction is as to cases “in which a State may be
Party.” That included not just state-on-state controversies, which are
functionally like international disputes among the states but also potential
suits brought by foreign states against states for systemic treaty violations,
such as of the 1783 Treaty of Peace.195
B. Appellate Jurisdiction Is the Supreme Court’s “Essential Role”
Today, the Supreme Court is viewed primarily as a constitutional appellate
court in both expert and popular opinion, but the plain language of Article III
suggests another essential role: the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction
over foreign ambassadorial cases and interstate or international controversies
involving states. In the present day, the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction
is only rarely exercised and almost exclusively in state-as-party cases, but
that was not the original constitutional plan, an intuition borne out by Article
IX of the Articles of Confederation, the provisions of the Judiciary Act of
1789, and the Court’s early cases, the first of which was Vanstophorst.
It is important to emphasize that judicial review—the “judicial duty to say
what the law is” as a matter of federal treaty, statute, or the Constitution—
can and does arise in the exercise of the Court’s original jurisdiction, too, and
not only by the Court’s appellate jurisdiction. Furthermore, original
192. The equivalent on land would be for federal judges to decide all legal questions
regarding the conduct of sieges or captures of prisoners or confiscation or destruction of roads,
food, bridges, and crops as enemy property during land warfare. Of course, granting federal
judicial power to decide such matters was not a part of the original constitutional plan, which
was based on anticipated international conflicts at sea where there would be less need to
account for overlapping and dominant state judicial power.
193. 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
194. U.S CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
195. See Lee supra note 97, at 1849–66.
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jurisdiction entails power to decide the entire case or controversy that
appellate jurisdiction limited to issues that “arise under” federal law does not,
although any adjudication of state law would not be binding on state courts.
For example, one way to think about Marbury is as a failed attempt by the
petitioner for a writ of mandamus against U.S. Secretary of State James
Madison to assert that the Court could entertain his petition because his
“Case” was one “affecting” a “public Minister,” namely, Madison. Of
course, the Court implicitly and correctly presumed that the original
jurisdiction clause applied only to “all Cases affecting” foreign
“Ambassadors, other public Ministers, or Consuls,” not American ministers,
because the clause was about minimizing foreign friction, not about
preventing executive branch officials from violating the legal rights of
Americans. It was possible for an American to sue a state, including for a
claim under a constitutional provision such as the Contract Clause, under a
plain reading of Article III and section 13 of the First Judiciary Act as the
Court in Chisholm held. However, this possibility was foreclosed by the
ratification of the Eleventh Amendment.196 But as the recent motion for
leave to file in the Court in Texas v. Pennsylvania197 demonstrates, judicial
review of important issues by states suing to invoke the Court’s original
jurisdiction (e.g., for unconstitutional selection of presidential electors by
another state) is a surging phenomenon.198 Whatever the merits of Texas’s
specific motion, which was dismissed for lack of standing, the Court’s
original jurisdiction is a viable forum for airing important constitutional
issues with an impeccable originalist pedigree. This is particularly true given
the potential for conducting independent constitutional fact-finding before
the Court, perhaps even by jury, as section 13 of the First Judiciary Act
authorized. This intriguing way to think about constitutional adjudication at
the Supreme Court may seem fanciful, but it is consistent with the original
constitutional plan for the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction was seen as critical to ensure
the supremacy and uniformity of federal law, as Henry Hart famously
argued,199 but when the Constitution was framed and ratified, there were also
significant concerns about that jurisdiction that extended “both as to Law and
Fact,” based on the experience with the national court of appeals under the
Articles. At the time (before drafting and passage of the Bill of Rights), there
was no guarantee that the Court could not conduct a new jury retrial under
Article III to nullify the state proceedings. Edmund Pendleton, who backed
the Constitution at Virginia’s ratifying convention and was its first chief
196. The Eleventh Amendment states: “The Judicial power of the United States shall not
be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of
the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”
U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
197. No. 155, Orig., 2020 WL 7296814 (U.S. Dec. 11, 2020) (mem.) (denying leave to file
a bill of complaint for lack of standing).
198. See Motion for Leave to File Bill of Complaint, Texas, 2020 WL 7296814 (No. 155,
Orig.).
199. See generally Hart, supra note 15.
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justice, spoke for the view of many regarding Article III: “I object to the
appellate jurisdiction as the greatest evil in it.”200 Consequently, he and other
moderate Federalists believed that salvation lay in a robust power for
Congress to make regulations and exceptions to the appellate jurisdiction.201
C. The Importance of “All Cases Arising Under” Federal Law
As described in Part I.D, there was no constitutional arising under
jurisdiction implemented in the Judiciary Act of 1789 except for crimes,
seizures under federal revenue and customs laws, and the ATS.202 Indeed,
although specialized arising under statutes like the ATS were occasionally
enacted in the nineteenth century to protect important federal interests, a
lasting general federal-question jurisdiction statute was not enacted until
1875 after the Civil War.203 By contrast, controversies between states were
not only an important part of the Court’s original jurisdiction in the Judiciary
Act, interstate controversies were also a key subject matter of the Articles of
Confederation system.204 And yet there is no “all” before “Controversies
between two or more States” in Article III.
The upshot is that Justice Joseph Story’s presumption that “all” before
“Cases” is significant and requires mandatory jurisdiction not
constitutionally required for “Controversies”205 does not fit the words of the
Constitution or the original constitutional plan. The key primary sources do
not confirm the modern intuition that “arising under” jurisdiction must be
vested in federal courts. Again, a large part of the perceived essentiality of
Article III federal-question jurisdiction is that it includes jurisdiction of cases
“arising under” the Constitution and therefore provides a textual basis for the
Court’s power of judicial review for constitutionality. But judicial review
could and was exercised under other heads of Article III jurisdiction.
D. Original and Appellate Jurisdiction Are Qualitatively Different
If the idea of “appellate jurisdiction” was an outgrowth of the national
court of appeals from the Articles of Confederation, which is the sense we
200. 9 DHRC, supra note 72, at 1101 (June 10, 1788).
201. See 10 id. at 1399–1400 (June 19, 1788) (reporting Pendleton’s assertions that
Congress’s power to make regulations and exceptions to the appellate jurisdiction was the
“great security” against it and that Congress, being composed of representatives of all the
states, would not suffer to allow citizens to be forced to travel “a great distance” to pursue
appeals to the Supreme Court).
202. See supra text accompanying notes 120–24; see also Donald H. Zeigler, Gazing into
the Crystal Ball: Reflections on the Standards State Judges Should Use to Ascertain Federal
Law, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1143, 1147 n.14 (1999).
203. See Removal of Causes Act, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470, 470 (1875) (“That the circuit
courts of the United States shall have original cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the
several States, of all suits of a civil nature . . . and arising under the Constitution or laws of the
United States . . . .”).
204. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, supra note 176, at 478 (Alexander Hamilton) (“[T]he
national judiciary ought to preside in all cases in which one State or its citizens are opposed
to another State or its citizens.”).
205. See supra note 20.
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get from the Virginia Plan and the Convention materials, then “Appellate
Jurisdiction” as the words are used in Article III means a full-blown
reexamination of facts and law. “Appellate” jurisdiction essentially means
“retrial,” no matter how brief or protracted the proceedings were in the court
of original jurisdiction.206 Hence, section 12 removal jurisdiction in the
Judiciary Act of 1789 was viewed as an instance of appellate jurisdiction,
even when a suit was merely filed without any proceedings in state court. On
the opposite end, a suit already tried to jury verdict in state court could be
removed to federal court and there retried by federal judges and still be
viewed as a species of appellate jurisdiction. This latter possibility validated
the concerns about federal appellate jurisdiction raised in the state ratifying
conventions, which ultimately resulted in the Re-examination Clause of the
Seventh Amendment to close off posttrial removals to nullify civil jury
verdicts. The self-constraint mechanism that the First Congress imposed
despite this potential constitutional breadth of appellate jurisdiction was the
“writ of error” (versus “appeal” as typical in admiralty and maritime suits) in
section 22 (circuit courts) and section 25 (state courts) of the Judiciary Act.207
The presumption among modern federal courts scholars that original and
appellate jurisdiction are entirely different has caused confusion about the
nature of the early federal court system, such as the belief that appellate
jurisdiction is necessary for the Supreme Court to exercise its constitutional
duty to declare federal law. Indeed, original jurisdiction is in theory a more
effective means of judicial review because it gives the Court power to decide
the entire case or controversy, not just the federal questions and hence cannot
be blocked by pretextual state law grounds, although the Court’s view of state
law would not be binding on state courts. Additionally, if Article III
“appellate Jurisdiction” differed from “original Jurisdiction” only in that the
case “originated” in another court before reaching the “appellate” court—
then it reinforces the need for Congress’s power to make “Exceptions” and
“Regulations” to it, as the First Congress did so robustly. Moreover,
understanding the equivalence helps us to perceive how federal court
exclusive original jurisdiction and Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction were
viewed as functional substitutes, and so the First Congress’s creation of the
former mitigated the imperative for the latter. Finally, grasping that there is
very little conceptual difference between original and appellate jurisdiction
makes it hard to accept, at least as an originalist matter, the “appellate
review” model that Article III review of legal questions and deference as to
fact-finding satisfies any Article III concerns about Congress conferring
judicial power to non–Article III tribunals.
E. Reliance on State Law and Common Law for Substance and Procedure
The Rules of Decision Act and the First Process Act show that the First
Congress endeavored to limit reliance on state law and common law,
206. See RITZ, supra note 120, at 6–7.
207. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, §§ 22, 25, 1 Stat. 73, 84–87.
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applying state law in common-law causes of action only, but not equity
causes or admiralty and maritime suits, both in terms of substantive rules of
decision and procedural rules. Section 16 of the Judiciary Act made clear
that equity was a last resort, unavailable “in any case where [a] plain,
adequate and complete remedy may be had at law.”208 But of course there
were many admiralty and maritime suits in the late eighteenth century, and
equity was also an important and growing aspect of the early federal courts’
business (e.g., deciding title to land based on conflicting state grants and
claims), growing to the point that today equity almost seems the norm, not
the exception. The fact that the First Process Act required courts to apply
“the forms and modes of proceedings . . . according to the course of the civil
law,”209 however short-lived, is a telling confirmation of the extent to which
the founders were willing to experiment with foreign rule-of-law modes,
move away from the English common-law example, and provide a hospitable
forum for continental European merchants, creditors, and litigants.
F. Federal Courts and State Sovereignty
The conventional wisdom is that an important function of the Supreme
Court and the federal courts is to protect state sovereignty and the
constitutional commitment to federalism. That view was strongly voiced in
Justice James Iredell’s dissent in Chisholm (which was abrogated by the
Eleventh Amendment), underpinned Chief Justice Roger Taney’s infamous
majority opinion in Dred Scott v. Sandford,210 later returned in postReconstruction Supreme Court precedents, and underwent a modern
resurgence in Rehnquist Court anti-commandeering and state sovereign
immunity decisions.211
But the Chisholm majority may have been correct in interpreting the
original Article III as permitting it to decide a suit brought by a South
Carolinian against Georgia based on contracts the state had allegedly
breached, as Justice John Marshall Harlan surmised in his concurrence in
Hans v. Louisiana.212 Certainly, offering the Supreme Court up as a credibly
neutral forum for the resolution of state sovereign debt cases is a plausible
reading of the original meaning of Article III and consistent with the general
original orientation of setting up the national judiciary to solve “state as
party” controversies, including commercial and contract debt cases. Recall,
on this point, that the first case on the Supreme Court’s docket was
Vanstophorst and that Maryland’s attorney general, Luther Martin, a noted
anti-Federalist, did not object to the Court’s original jurisdiction.
208. Id. § 16, 1 Stat. at 82–83.
209. Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 21, § 2, 1 Stat. 93, 93–94 (repealed 1792).
210. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), superseded in part by constitutional amendment, U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
211. See generally Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (invalidating federal law
because it commandeered state legislatures); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996)
(holding Congress may not use the Article I Indian Commerce Clause to abrogate Florida’s
sovereign immunity).
212. 134 U.S. 1, 21 (1890) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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I do not mean to overdo this point, and it bears remembering that the First
Congress was parsimonious in dispensing Article III judicial power precisely
because it sought to limit encroachment by the new federal courts on
preexisting state judicial power, juries, and the business of the state courts.
The federal judicial power was deployed very sparingly and exclusively only
as to federal crimes, admiralty and maritime cases, and matters of revenue,
forfeiture, and penalty under U.S. impost and trade laws. But I think it is
equally clear that within those exclusive enclaves (with the important
exception of the saving-to-suitors exception to admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction), during the critical early years and especially from 1789 to 1792,
state rules of decision and procedures were displaced in favor of the law of
nations and civil law. In other words, there was a clear and strong desire to
depart from state and English precedents in these subject matters of greatest
interest for foreign merchants, creditors, and public litigants. The aim was
to entice foreigners to bring their grievances in the new federal courts rather
than to face inhospitable state courts or to lobby foreign sovereigns to resort
to political measures including war, which would have been disastrous for
the demilitarized United States from 1787 to 1792.
G. The Supreme Court Is Predominantly a Public Law Institution
The early Supreme Court did hear many important public law cases that
are famous today, but it was also designed to hear international commercial
cases like Vanstophorst, the first case docketed at the Court in 1791.
Certainly, commercial and public maritime cases featured prominently on the
dockets of the lower federal courts in the late eighteenth century and well
into the early nineteenth century.213 Diversity jurisdiction in the late
eighteenth century was functionally similar to international commercial
arbitration today—a credibly neutral form of dispute resolution available to
foreigners and out-of-state parties to encourage cross-border loans, business
deals, shipping, trade, and investment. Both experts and the public today
perceive the Supreme Court as a constitutional and appellate court. But the
original plan for it included much more: an international commercial court,
a diplomatic court, an interstate umpire, and to borrow Edmund Randolph’s
words from the Virginia Plan that launched the Constitutional Convention, a
trial court of “dèrnier resort.”214
CONCLUSION
My aim in this Article has been to use primary sources to draw an accurate
picture of what the adopters of the Constitution’s judiciary article and the
First Congress which implemented it were doing from 1787 to 1792, the
critical years in which the Constitution was adopted and the federal courts

213. Kevin Arlyck, Plaintiffs v. Privateers: Litigation and Foreign Affairs in the Federal
Courts, 1816–1822, 30 LAW & HIST. REV. 245, 275 (2012) (“[T]he dockets of the lower courts
were crowded with admiralty actions . . . .”).
214. 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 211.
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established. I do not claim to have uncovered any new source that the great
scholars of the early federal courts—Warren, Goebel, and Ritz—did not
previously locate and describe to some degree. But attempting to reconstruct
history is a kaleidoscope. Every lawyer-scholar looks for different things
and notices different things at different times in history. In the early and
mid–twentieth century, when Warren and Goebel labored in these vineyards,
they sought to curtail federal judicial lawmaking vis-à-vis Congress and
reinforce the primacy of state regulation of Americans’ primary conduct and
interactions, notwithstanding the onset of the modern administrative state.
The pro-foreigner orientation, the robust specification of the Supreme
Court’s original jurisdiction, the pinpoint nature of the lower federal courts’
exclusive original arising under jurisdiction, and the severe regulation of the
Court’s appellate jurisdiction were not prominent concerns given those
eminent scholars’ perspectives.
What is the picture that emerges of the original constitutional plan for the
federal courts from 1787 to 1792? There was a strong consensus that the new
courts should not encroach on the state courts beyond what important
national interests required. Consequently, and for reasons of cost, the federal
courts were designed to have a small footprint that focused on the oceans, the
principal paths of international and interstate trade and commerce. (Justice
Story would conquer the seas and move the pro-commerce campaign
landward in the nineteenth century.) There is very little sense that the new
national courts were to play a leading role in domestic governance or in
protecting the rights of Americans. In fact, there was a distinct, hardwired
favoritism for foreign litigants, especially foreign diplomats. And the
Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction (including jury trials and an unlimited
power of judicial review over the entire case or controversy) was an essential
feature of this federal judicial system as originally planned.
What this all means for constitutional jurisprudence and federal judiciary
reform today is a separate question. It is noteworthy that originalism as a
mode of constitutional interpretation is ascendant both on the Supreme Court
and in the academy. An accurate picture of the original constitutional plan
accordingly seems more important than ever. Additionally, there are
increasing calls for reforming the Supreme Court and the federal judicial
system. A better understanding of the original constitutional plan can inform
our sense of the art of the possible in terms of federal court reform and foster
an appreciation for the complexity of the problem. But at the end of the day,
my primary aim has been to draw a more accurate picture of the original
constitutional plan, without an eye for modern implications. In that respect,
I have been surprised and learned greatly from trying to reconstruct the past.

